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BOOK REVIEW
SEEING THE CONSTITUTION FROM THE BACKSEAT
OF A POLICE SQUAD CAR
TEMPERED ZEAL By H. Richard Uviller.*
Contemporary Books, Chicago, Illinois. 1988.
Pp. xix, 234. $19.95.

Reviewed by Tracey Macln**

I.

INTRODUCTION

As an observer of the United States Supreme Court's criminal procedure
docket, I often ask myself whether the Justices have a true picture of what
has actually happened in a case. Did the police officer really see a bulge in
the jacket as the suspect got out of his car, or did the officer simply make-up
the claim to justify an illegal frisk?' Was the officer really looking for the
vehicle identification number ("VIN"), managing to discover-by blind
luck-the protruding handle of a gun? Or, was this a garden-variety search
for narcotics accompanied by a cover story about the VIN search to please
the courts?2
At the same time, I have wondered what it is like to be a cop in some of
the scenarios that come before the Court. Is it possible for the Court to
understand the perspective of the police officer placed in the middle of a
street encounter? When the Court is reviewing and deciding a case, it only
has the briefs of the lawyers and the cold record. An officer who decides
whether to stop or search a person does not have the benefit of counsel's
*

Professor of Law, Columbia University.

** Visiting Professor of Law, Cornell Law School; Professor of Law, Boston

University School of Law. J.D., Columbia University School of Law (1983); B.A., Tufts
University (1980). I would like to thank Ted Eisenberg, Steve Shiffrin, Joe Singer and
Larry Yackle for reading an earlier draft of this paper. I also thank Michele Perusse for
her research assistance.
1 See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977) (per curiam) (upholding a
conviction for carrying a concealed, unlicensed firearm when the police found the firearm
during a frisk performed subsequent to seeing a bulge under the defendant's jacket after
the defendant stepped out of his car to produce his driver's license and registration).
2 See, e.g., New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106 (1986) (upholding a conviction for
criminal possession of a weapon when the officers found the weapon while searching for
the VIN after stopping the defendant for traffic violations).
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wisdom; the officer, unlike the Court, is required to make quick decisions
that affect the life and liberty of presumably innocent persons.
Should the cops be blamed for conducting the search that is later attacked
as being without sufficient justification? What would I have done if I had
been in the shoes of the police officer? If confronted with an allegedly
armed person, sitting alone in a car on a deserted city street in the middle of
the night, would I too have tried to disarm the suspect?3 Or take this scenario, for example: a woman approached police officers and told them that she
had just been raped by Benjamin Quarles, and that he had a gun.4 How
would I have responded if I had been the first officer to reach Quarles?
Would I have seriously thought about reading Quarles his Miranda rights,
or would I have first tried to discover-as the officer did-where Quarles
had put the gun that was no longer in the shoulder holster he was wearing?5
These and other questions are a criminal procedure professor's arsenal. In
the academic environment, one has the luxury to criticize the Court's rulings
as short-sighted and hostile to our constitutional liberties, or to praise the
Court's decisions as practical compromises to the problems of protecting
society in an increasingly dangerous time. Of course, police officers engaged
in law enforcement activities often do not have the time for the considered
judgment that law professors expect from their students.6 Moreover, the
individual enmeshed in a police encounter cannot summon judicial supervision of the officer's conduct. "The citizen's choice is quietly to submit to
whatever the officers undertake or to resist at risk of arrest or immediate
violence." 7
Some of the difficulties, frustrations and pleasures of being a cop are richly
3 See, e.g., Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972) (reversing a Second Circuit Court

of Appeals decision that an officer who, acting on a tip, removed a gun from defendant's
waistband while seated in his car, illegally searched the defendant).
4 New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 651-652 (1984) (reversing the New York Court
of Appeals which held that the defendant's initial statements and the gun should be
excluded from evidence because the police had not yet read Miranda warnings to the
defendant).
I As described by Justice Rehnquist, the author of Quarles, the first officer to reach
Quarles "frisked him and discoverd that [Quarles] was wearing a shoulder holster which
was then empty." Id. at 652. After handcuffing Quarles, the officer then "asked" Quarles
where the gun was. After Quarles indicated where the gun was, the police retrieved the
gun and placed Quarles under formal arrest. At this point, the police read Quarles his
Miranda rights. Id.
6 Professor Uviller makes a similar point:
[T]he judicial rendition of the 'facts' of a case should not be taken for a true core
sample of police behavior. A court opinion rarely reflects the alteration between
decision and indecision, the mix of fear and aggression, the blend of caution and
desire that characterize police action in the field.
H.R. UVILLER, TEMPERED ZEAL xi-xii (1988).
7 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 182 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting), reh'g
denied, 448 U.S. 839 (1949).
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described in Professor H. Richard Uviller's book, Tempered Zeal.' Professor Uviller, an experienced player in and observer of the criminal justice
system, chronicles the lives and times of some of New York City's "finest"
assigned to the Ninth Precinct. Located on Manhattan's Lower Eastside,
the "Fighting 9th," better known to the troops as "th[e] shithouse precinct"
(p. 2), sets the stage for Professor Uviller's thoughtful insights on the interaction between police work and constitutional law. These insights include:
the cops' view that the Justices of the Supreme Court and their rulings are
"unrealistic" (p. 21); their belief that " '[t]he Miranda warnings do not make
a particle of difference ....
It's just plain silly. In the first place, nobody
we're interested in talking to believes a word we tell them. Whether it's for
their own good or not.'" (p. 208); and Professor Uviller's assertion that
"[a]lthough no one admitted it to me in so many words, I think most police
officers regard... [perjurous] alterations of events as the natural and inevitable outgrowth of artificial and unrealistic post facto judgments that release
criminals" (p. 116). These and other controversial issues--questions that
involve the collision between the daily responsibilities of the police to promote law and order and the commands of the Constitution that protect the
citizenry from arbitrary and oppressive government intrusion-are explored
by Professor Uviller.
Much of the book details the activities and personalities of the Ninth Precinct Robbery Identification Program ("9 RIP"). 9 RIP is an experimental
unit begun in April 1982 to help stem the high number of robberies in the
precinct.9 The unit contains a sergeant and twelve officers, some of whom
are detectives ("gold shields"), and the rest of whom are regular police
officers ("white shields") (p. 9).
The dominant theme of Tempered Zeal is that the officers of the. Ninth
Precinct generally, and those in 9 RIP particularly, approach their tasks
with an admirable degree of common sense and a "nose" for justice.'0 Police
officers have a tough job. They are not permitted, however, to approach
their tasks with a single-minded purpose. Professor Uviller aptly observes
that society demands conflicting performances from its police officers. "We
want them eager but not overeager, aggressive but not oppressive, tough but
friendly, involved but detached, 'human,' but 'professional.'" (p. 231). The
8

H.R. UVILLER, supra note 6.

9 As described by Professor Uviller, the Ninth Precinct
is .79 square miles in area but it is crossed by over 21 miles of streets. It has about
67,500 residents, of whom some 26,000 identify themselves as Hispanic, 15,000 as

white, and 9,000 as black. Covering the notorious East Village, the Precinct
stretches south for about a mile from Fourteenth Street to East Houston and from
Broadway east to the [East] River.

Id. at 3.
10 According to Professor Uviller, police officers are not overzealous invaders of
constitutional liberties: "It's strange, but I have seen the same sort of thing often enough
to phrase it as an axiom: Law enforcement agencies tend to overestimate restrictions on
their authority." Id. at 79.

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:543

dual roles that society requires of the cop-the "gun slinging crime fighter"
alongside the "judicious creature of constitutional integrity"-is rarely
demanded of other public servants (p. 231).
Professor Uviller's book raises and explores many important questions
about the attitudes of police officers regarding the public, their jobs, and the
Constitution. His discussion is particularly timely now that our political
leaders appear ready to declare another "War on Drugs" in which the police
will provide the frontline of the nati6n's defense." The police will be called
upon to shoulder an enormous burden in the fight against drugs and other
criminal conduct.
More importantly, because the activities of the police are often in tension
with the civil liberties we cherish,' 2 it is important that sobiety have a full
understanding of the interplay between constitutional principle and the
"common sense" of the officer on the beat. Professor Uviller illuminates the
perspective of the police officer in a context that involves fundamental values
at the heart of our criminal justice process.
Professor Uviller provides an enlightening and fascinating portrayal of the
police perspective. My aim in this essay, however, is not to write a traditional, page-by-page review of his book.'" I have a different challenge in
mind. As Professor Uviller candidly acknowledges in the beginning of his
book, much of what he witnessed on the streets and in the station house may
have been affected by a certain bias toward law enforcement. He believes
that "the primary purpose of the criminal justice system is to separate the
guilty from the innocent" (pp. xiii-xiv). Thus, he is less concerned "with
such questions as whether the suspect was accorded his full Miranda warnings at precisely the appropriate time or whether he received the assistance
of counsel as he stood in a lineup" (p. xiv). 4 He is more "concerned that the
evidence bearing directly on guilt be pursued vigorously and evaluated conscientiously" (p. xiv).
11 See, e.g., Berke, After Studyingfor War on Drugs, Bennett Wants More Troops, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 6, 1989, § 4 (The Week In Review), at 5 (noting that the primary weapon in
the Bush Administration's War on Drugs is expanded law enforcement and criminal
justice).
12 The classic formulation of this conflict was stated by Justice Stewart:
It is not enough to argue, as does the Government, that the problem of deterring
unlawful [conduct] is a serious one. The needs of law enforcement stand in constant
tension with the Constitution's protections of the individual against certain exercises
of official power. It is precisely the predictability of these pressures that counsels a
resolute loyalty to constitutional safeguards.
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273 (1973).
13 For a traditional review of Tempered Zeal, see Sulcoski, Book Review, 87 MICH. L.
REV. 1311 (1989); Boyer, N.Y. Times, July 17, 1988, § 7 (Book Review), at 21, col. 1.
14 For a more detailed account of Professor Uviller's view on the role of defense
counsel during a pre-trial lineup, see Uviller, Evidence From The Mind Of The Criminal

Suspect: A Reconsideration Of The CurrentRules OfAccess And Restraint, 87 COLUM. L.
REV.

1137, 1165-1176 (1987).
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I too, approach questions involving police-citizen encounters with a certain bias. I believe that many of these encounters are inherently unequal.' 5
Supreme Court rulings in this area have not taken adequate account of this
fact. While legislators and their constituents will always be more concerned
with incarcerating the "guilty,' 16 the Supreme Court-in my. view-must
17
decide cases with a wider vision. The Court must also protect our rights.
My goal in this essay to is provide a different perspective from the view
advanced by Professor Uviller.
Some readers will probably agree with many of Professor Uviller's comments. For example, he describes being "completely convinc[ed]" by an
officer's description of sensing when a person on the street possesses an illegal handgun (p. 60). The officer's tip-off is "an almost imperceptible motion
[of the] hand as though gently pulling down the front of a shirt or jacket
over [a] belt" (p. 59). Professor Uviller also believes that the law should
permit police officers to effectuate what he calls a "sub-arrest" detention.
Such a procedure would allow physical seizure of a suspect on less than
probable cause, but would not permit interrogation by the police (pp. 79-85).
In another setting, Professor Uviller opines that one cause of police perjury-what he refers to as "the instrumental adjustment" (p. 11 5)-are
"unwieldy constitutional" rules that prevent the police from obtaining just
results (pp. 115-16). In his view, "some varieties of [police] perjury, if not
exactly virtuous, are less treacherous than others" (pp. 116-17). Although
11 Confronting a police officer is not like confronting a civilian. "Of course any
individual has a right to approach any other individual .... But it is not quite the same

when the police stop someone. There is authority in the approach of the police, and
command in their tone. I can ignore the ordinary person, but can I ignore the police?"
Reich, Police Questioning Of Law Abiding Citizens, 75 YALE L.J. 1161, 1162 (1966). See
also Foote, The Fourth Amendment: Obstacle or Necessity in the Law ofArrest, in POLICE
POWER AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM

29, 30 (C. Sowle ed. 1962) (stating that "what on

their face are merely words of request take on color from the officer's uniform, badge, gun
and demeanor").
16 Cf Amsterdam, Perspectives On The Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349,
378-79 (1974) ("Even if our growing crime rate and its attendant mounting hysteria
should level off, there will remain more than enough crime and fear of it in American
society to keep our legislatures from the politically suicidal undertaking of police
control.").
1'Justice Stewart's description of the dilemma posed by the fourth amendment is
equally applicable to other provisions of the Bill of Rights:
The inevitable result of the Constitution's prohibition against unreasonable searches
and seizures and its requirement that no warrant issue but upon probable cause is
that police officers who obey its strictures will catch fewer criminals. That is not a
political outcome impressed upon an unwilling citizenry by unbeknighted judges. It
is the price the framers anticipated and were willing to pay to ensure the sanctity of
the person, the home, and property against unrestrained governmental power.
Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins,Development and Future of
the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1393
(1983).
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Professor Uviller recognizes that our legal system has chosen to reject all
forms of perjury-whatever the descriptive label-he seems to sympathize
with the view of police officers who think that this choice is not "entirely
convincing" (pp. 117-18).
Finally, Professor Uviller takes aim at the Miranda ruling. After questioning the empirical basis of the decision,'" Professor Uviller concludes that the
reasoning of Miranda is inherently flawed: "ifa confession given in police
custody is necessarily coerced, so is a waiver" (p. 196). He also questions
whether the famous warnings do anything to protect a suspect's rights (pp.
186-97).
In this review/essay, I will attempt to offer a different outlook on these
and other constitutional issues discussed by Professor Uviller. As noted,
somereaders will find Professor Uviller's descriptions and commentary persuasive; others may be more inclined to agree with me. Whatever the case,
my hope is to stimulate debate about issues which both Professor Uviller and
I believe are fascinating and socially important.' 9
II.

ON

THE STREETS WITH THE POLICE

Professor Uviller wastes no time in describing how officers approach their
jobs and the individuals with whom they often have close, if not intimate,
contact. "Almost all the RIP cops I watched on the street displayed an
attitude of toughness and consideration toward the people they approached"
(p. 15). Officers display a no-nonsense style and generally expect certain
counter-responses from the persons they approach:
Police officers relish respect and, in many small ways, insist on a show
of deference from the ordinary 'folk among whom they work. They
know they represent force ...and they move with an air of confidence
that tells the world to yield the right of way as they pass by.... Manifest confidence begets submission, and the cops learn the firm tone and
hand that informs even the normally aggressive customer of the futility
of resistance. It's effective. In virtually every encounter I have witnessed, the response of the person approached was docile, compliant,
and respectful. (p. 16).
18 Professor Uviller derides the Court for relying on certain police manuals that
suggest different types of interrogation methods designed to get a suspect to confess:
"For one thing, even if the [police manuals] were circulated or' used in training, as the
Court claimed, no one-and certainly not the Court-could know whether the

recommended techniques were generally, or even frequently, employed." H.R.

UVILLER,

supra note 6, at 192.
19 In fact, because Professor Uviller provided my initial introduction to the fourth,
fifth and sixth amendments when I was a student in his criminal procedure course, I will
be forever indebted and grateful to him. His class was one of the most enjoyable courses I

took while in law school, and I recall with fond memory many of his "anecdotes" and the
debates we had in class.
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Professor Uviller supplements this telling characterization of the attitude
of the street cop with an excellent anecdote. One evening a 9 RIP patrol car
was hailed by three people who excitedly told the cops that moments earlier
"two or three male blacks riding in a white Lincoln and posing as undercover police officers had robbed two people on the street" (p. 14). The cops
were warned that the alleged robbers had guns-"Big ones!" Without explanation, however, the unknown informants turned down an offer to ride with
the cops to identify the car or the robbers (p. 14).
Soon the patrol car came across a white Lincoln waiting at a light. Three
cops, guns in hand, immediately approached the Lincoln and ordered the
shocked occupants-three black men and a white driver---out of their car.
The occupants were frisked and their car searched. No weapons were found.
The cops had seized the wrong car. How did the police respond?
"Hey, guys, sorry. Wrong car. Sorry we bothered you."
"What's going on?" one asks, mollified by the tone of voice and the
cops' abrupt retreat.
"Nothing, man. Got a description of a set of wheels like yours, that's
all."
"Hey, okay, man. No problem, right?" says another.
"Sure. Enjoy your evening now, okay?" the cop replies, though he
does not accept the proffered handshake. (pp. 14-15).
Professor Uviller's general characterization of the attitude of the street
cop, and his specific story involving the police confrontation with the white
Lincoln, raises fundamental questions involving the rights of citizens on the
street. His description of the attitude conveyed by the street cop toward
those enmeshed in a police-citizen encounter certainly rings true. When an
armed police officer seeks information from a person, the officer expects that
his or her presence will be heeded, and that the citizen approached will comply with the officer's wishes. When the Supreme Court was asked whether
any constitutional interests are implicated when an officer approaches and
questions a person, the Court found that such conduct does not amount to a
seizure because the average person would feel free to ignore the officer.20
The Court's conclusion was not only astonishing, but also hard to reconcile
with fourth amendment principles.
The fourth amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures.2 ' If
20 See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497-98 (1983) (plurality opinion) (stating that

when a person is approached by law enforcement officers on the street and asked
questions by the officer "he may decline to listen to the questions at all and may go on his
way"), reh'g denied, 448 U.S. 908 (1980); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544,
553-54 (1980) (opinion of Stewart, J.) (stating that "[a]s long as the person to whom
questions are put remains free to disregard the questions and walk away, there has been
no intrusion upon that person's liberty or privacy as would under the Constitution
require some particularized and objective justification").
21 The fourth amendment provides that: "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
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the Court finds that challenged governmental conduct does not constitute a
search or seizure, then no protected interest is implicated, and the government is free to pursue that conduct whether or not it has reasonable grounds
for believing criminality is afoot. When a cop accosts a citizen on the street,
the constitutional standard for measuring whether a seizure occurs is
whether-in light of the totality of22the circumstances-a reasonable person
would feel free to leave the scene.
The Court's conclusion that no seizure occurs when a police officer
approaches and questions a citizen-for example, by asking to see some type
of identification-is out of touch with the "real world" experiences described
by Professor Uviller. In the typical street encounter, few persons, if any, feel
free to ignore or leave the presence of a police officer who has approached
and questioned them. Professor Uviller's observation that in "virtually
every [police-citizen] encounter.. . the response of the person approached
was docile, compliant, and respectful" (p. 16) reaffirms what fourth amendment scholars have been saying for over twenty years: the average individual
who is approached by a police officer does not feel free to leave. 23
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or

affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
22 In Michigan v. Chesternut, 108 S.Ct. 1975, 1979 (1988), the Court conceded that
this standard was imprecise. Such imprecision, however, was necessary because the
standard was "designed to assess the coercive effect of police conduct, taken as a whole,
rather than focus on particular details of that conduct in isolation. Moreover, what
constitutes a restraint on liberty prompting a person to conclude that he is not free to
'leave' will vary, not only with the particular police conduct at issue, but also with the
setting in which the conduct occurs." Id.
After acknowledging the imprecision of the "reasonable person" standard, the
Chesternut Court reiterated the judicial gloss that had been placed on this standard in
IN.S.v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984). See Chesternut, 108 S.Ct. at 1981. In Delgado,
the Court explained that a police confrontation will not trigger the fourth amendment
"[u]nless the circumstances of the encounter are so intimidatingas to demonstrate that a
reasonable person would have believed he was not free to leave if he had not responded."

Delgado, 466 U.S. at 216 (emphasis added).
Thus, some degree of police intimidation is permissible during a police-citizen
encounter. The fourth amendment becomes relevant only when a police officer realizes
that his or her presence has crossed a magical threshold that is "so initimidating" that the
citizen feels constrained to remain. If the Court thought the Mendenhall standard was
imprecise, it is hard to see how the gloss of Delgado and Chesternut provides guidance to
police officers enmeshed in street encounters.
23 See, e.g., W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 9.2(h), at 410 (2d ed. 1987) (stating
that if the Court's view is "that a pedestrian whose movements have been interrupted and
who is questioned is likely to feel free to depart without responding, it is a highly
questionable conclusion"); Foote, supra note 15, at 35 ("No doubt many people feel
compelled to stop and answer when questioned by an officer, and the unavoidable
ambiguity in such a situation operates to the officer's advantage."); Butterfoss, Bright
Line Seizures.- The Need For Clarity In Determining When Fourth Amendment Activity
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Although the Court's sensitivity to constitutional freedom on this point is
suspect, its rulings in this area are troublesome for an additional reason. As
Professor Uviller describes, during street encounters officers develop "a
street mode that prove[s] workable for both them and their clientele" (p. 15).
Thus, in the case of the white Lincoln, while it is debatable whether the RIP
team had reasonable suspicion to stop the Lincoln, Professor Uviller
explains that the officers' interests in "ordinary efficiency" turned a potentially explosive situation into a routine encounter.
The Court's street encounter cases have also emphasized the primacy of
police "efficiency"-at the expense of the fourth amendment. For example,
in United States v. Mendenhall,24 two agents of the Drug Enforcement
Agency approached Mendenhall as she was walking through an airport concourse. The agents identified themselves as federal agents, and asked to see
Mendenhall's identification and airline ticket.2" Setting the standard that
would eventually become the constitutional test, Justice Stewart emphasized
that if this police encounter" was considered a seizure under the fourth
amendment, such a rule "would impose wholly unrealistic restrictions upon
a wide variety of legitimate law enforcement practices. ' 27 Indeed, Justice
Stewart reaffirmed the "acknowledged need for police questioning as a tool
in the effective enforcement of the criminal laws." 2s Other, more recent
examples of the Court's concern for police efficiency and flexibility in questioning citizens are plentiful.'
Begins, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 437, 439 (1988) ("[Ilt is generally accepted that,

in fact, citizens almost never feel free to end an encounter initiated by a police officer and
walk away."); Williamson, The Dimensions of Seizure.- The Concepts of "Stop" and
"Arrest", 43 Ohio St. L.J. 771, 801 (1982) (agreeing with Professor LaFave "that a
realistic appraisal of the probable response of an individual who is confronted by law
enforcement officials seeking information always will be that he or she is not free to
ignore the officers and walk away"); Bogomolny, Street Patrol." The Decision to Stop a
Citizen, 12 Crim. L. Bull. 544, 562 (1976) ("If we rely on the citizen's reasonable
perception as a standard against which we measure the encounter, we must admit that
the' contact situation is one in which the citizen may feel intimidated.").
24 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
25 Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 547-48.
26 When I use the term "police encounter,"
"street encounter," or "police

confrontation," I refer to the typical case where a police officer approaches an individual
and asks the person to provide some identification or to account for his or her presence.
The typical police encounter, however, need not always occur on the street. It can take
place in a factory, see Delgado, 466 U.S. at 212; in an airport, see Royer, 460 U.S. at 49394; Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 547-49; or in the back of a bus, see Bostick v. Florida, 554
So. 2d 1153, 1154-55 (Fla. 1989).
27 Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554 (opinion of Stewart, J.).
28

Id.

I The Court's rulings in Chesternut and Delgado illustrate that individuals, who the

police have no reason to suspect of criminality, do not have a right to come and go as
they please. Instead, the fourth amendment's protection against unreasonable seizures
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Viewed from the perspective of the cop, Justice Stewart's observations
seem unchallengable. If the police are to succeed in shouldering the burden
in the nation's "war on drugs," it would be foolhardy to restrict their
authority to stop and question persons. As Professor Uviller suggests,
officers will need the flexibility to utilize their common sense in dealing with
those they confront on the street. Accordingly, "ordinary efficiency" would
appear to be the correct touchstone for assessing the legality of street
encounters.
Notwithstanding the alluring quality of the Court's efficiency analysis,
however, there are several dangers in this approach. If efficiency and flexibility are the relevent criteria for measuring the legality of police confrontations, consider the proper constitutional result in the following three cases.
First, a local sheriff's department posts a highway sign warning that a narcotics inspection awaits all motorists. The sheriff and his deputies then stop
all vehicles that slow down or seek to avoid the roadblock.30 Second, some
officers board a bus in the middle of an interstate trip and begin "interviewing" passengers to obtain the consent to search their luggage for illegal narcotics.3 ' Third, and even more troublesome, how should we feel about a
plan that requires residents and visitors of public housing to show identification to enter?
In each example, the police conduct arguably advances interests of government efficiency and serves the community's need for effective law enforcement. The problem is that the fourth amendment was not designed to
promote government efficiency. To avoid this point, the Court will often
speak of the minimal nature of police intrusions, 32 emphasize the need for

merely affords a person the right not to be subjected to a police presence that is not "so
intimidating." Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 1980-81 (stating that presence of a police car
driving parallel to a running pedestrian, although it could be "somewhat intimidating...
was not 'so intimidating' that respondent could reasonably have believed that he was not
free to disregard the police presence and go about his business") (citations and footnote
omitted); Delgado, 466 U.S. at 216 (holding that questioning relating to one's identity or
a request for identification by government agents, standing alone, does not constitute a
seizure).
30 See Mydans, Powerful Arms of Drug War Arousing Concern for Rights, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 16, 1989, at Al, col. I.
31 See, e.g., Bostick, 554 So. 2d at 1158-59 (Fla. 1989) (holding that an
unconstitutional seizure occured when police conducted a drug search on a bus bound
from Miami to Atlanta during scheduled stops and questioned passengers without
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity).
32 See, e.g., United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 232 (1985) (stating that "[t]he law
enforcement interests promoted by allowing one [police] department to make
investigatory stops based upon another department's bulletins or flyers are considerable,

while the intrusion on personal security is minimal").
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of
police effectiveness and flexibility,33 and remind us of the difficulty
4
detecting and apprehending those who peddle illegal narcotics.3
None of these responses are sufficient if fourth amendment freedoms are
to be taken seriously. Does the Court really want us to believe-as it suggested in Michigan v. Chesternut-thatthe average person will think nothing

of being chased down a street by a car load of armed police officers?' There
is nothing minimally intrusive about this type of police conduct. Although
the Justices may believe that being pursued by a police car is not " 'so intimidating' " that a reasonable person would feel free to disregard the police
presence,' I think it a safe bet that most Americans would not be so sanguine about their freedom in such circumstances.
Likewise, what should we make of the observation that a police procedure
promotes interests of "ordinary efficiency"? What does-efficiency have to do

with preserving the rights embodied in the fourth amendment?37 A "police
department that scrupulously honors individual rights may be regarded as
more 'efficient' than a department that 'catches more crooks' but breaks
more rules. It all depends against what standard one measures 'police
efficiency." "
Stopping motorists who try to avoid drug inspection roadblocks may be
highly efficient if one assumes that motorists who wish to avoid an invasion
of their privacy automatically become suspected drug dealers. This view,
however, assigns no weight to our cherished right-embodied in the fourth
amendment-to come and go without having to account for our actions to
government officers.
Similarly, requiring people who enter public housing projects to show
See, e.g., United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985) (rejecting a bright-line
rule for the permissible length of an investigative seizure; holding instead that a court
should consider "whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was
likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to
detain the defendant").
31 See, e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 704 (1983) (stating that "[b]ecause of
the inherently transient nature of drug courier activity at airports, allowing police to
make brief investigative stops of persons at airports on reasonable suspicion of drugtrafficking substantially enhances the likelihood that police will be able to prevent the
flow of narcotics into distribution channels") (footnote omitted).
35 See Chesternut, 109 S. Ct. at 1980 (stating that being chased by the police, in the
situation presented by this case, "would not have communicated to the reasonable person
an attempt to capture or otherwise intrude upon . . freedom of movement").
36 See id.
33

Cf Kamisar, "Comparative Reprehensibility" And The Fourth Amendment
Exclusionary Rule, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1, 31 (1987) (asking "[b]ut doesn't the fourth
31

amendment have something to say about expediency versus principle?... But doesn't it
mean something? Is not its very purpose-and that of the Bill of Rights generally-'to
identify values that may not be sacrificed to expediency'?") (footnotes omitted).

38 Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) The Exclusionary Rule Rest On A "PrincipledBasis"
Rather Than An "EmpiricalProposition"?, 16 CREIGHTON L. REV. 565, 648 (1983).
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identification might be viewed as an effective way of deterring narcotics trafficking; such a measure might even be supported by many residents. 39 And,
like the narcotics inspection roadblock, requiring people to show identification can always be defended as a measure designed to detect and expose
those engaged in criminal conduct. But, an accurate efficiency analysis must
include more factors than these.
Assume, for the sake of argument, that this identification procedure is
effective in deterring crime. The police then implement a more expansive
procedure that requires all persons entering a particular neighborhood to
show identification. Should we sanction these procedures because they deter
crime? No. These regulations simply cannot be harmonized with the ideal
that American citizens are entitled to walk the streets without explanation or
identification papers. The freedom to come and go as we please is one of the
rights that separates this country from the rest of the world."
These interests are seldom addressed by those who urge giving the police
greater authority to restrict the liberty of citizens."
39

Although it may be

The chairman of the Chicago Housing Authority, Vincent Lane, was no doubt

speaking for many of the residents of Chicago's public housing projects when he defended
regulations designed to rid public housing of drug dealers: "We are not infringing on
rights; we are restoring rights. We are restoring our residents' rights to a safe and decent
environment." Mydans, supra note 30, at B10, col. 3.
40 Gomez v. Turner, 672 F.2d 134, 143-44 n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (stating, "[t]hat
citizens can walk the streets, without explanation or formal papers, is surely among the
cherished liberties that distinguish this nation from so many others").
41 One possible explanation why fourth amendment interests are often ignored is the
misconceived notion that the provision does not provide any substantive protection. One
recent example of such reasoning occurred in Waters v. Barry, 711 F. Supp. 1121 (D.
D.C. 1989). The decision in Waters invalidated the District of Columbia's juvenile
curfew statute. The law made "it illegal for persons below the age of 18 to be on the
streets of the District between 11:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m." Id. at 1127 (footnote omitted).
Although the court invalidated the law on other constitutional grounds, it rejected the
plaintiffs' fourth amendment claim that the law permits groundless seizures of the youth
of the District. The court stated that the plaintiffs' argument, in effect, was "an attempt
to find in the Fourth Amendment an absolute right to be free from searches and seizures,
a right that cannot be limited by the government's power to criminalize certain forms of
behavior." Id. at 1138.
The court reasoned that the fourth amendment affords no substantive protection; it
acts merely as a procedural device to bar searches and seizures until the government has
the requisite justification for action. "[A]s the very language of the Fourth Amendment
provides, a right to be free from such intrusions exists only so long as there is not
probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed." Id. According to the
court, because the District has made it a crime for teenagers to be on the street during
curfew hours, police have probable cause for an arrest whenever a youth is seen in public
during the curfew period.
This reasoning is misplaced for two reasons. First, the court is wrong when it states
that the fourth amendment's protection against unreasonable seizures is exhausted once
government officials have probable cause that a crime has occurred. An analogous
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tempting during a time of crisis to turn to expedient solutions, reliance on
argument was rejected in Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985). In Garner, it was
argued that if probable cause exists, the fourth amendment has nothing to say about how
a seizure is effectuated. Id. at 7. The Court dismissed this claim and explained that the
fourth amendment's requirement of reasonable seizures "depends on not only when a
seizure is made, but also how it is carried out." Id. at 8.
Waters also errs in not recognizing that, as a textual and normative proposition, the
fourth amendment provides a substantive freedom that recognizes a right to walk the
streets. The fourth amendment contains two separate clauses. The second clause deals
with warrants: "and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The first clause of the fourth amendment
states that: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated." Id. This
clause recognizes an independent right of personal sovereignty and liberty. See N.
LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT To THE

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 103 (1937) (the initial clause of the fourth amendment
grants an independent right of security from unreasonable search and seizure; the
prohibition contained in the first clause was designed "to cover something other than the
form of [a] warrant"). See also Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980) (stating
that "the evil the Amendment was designed to prevent was broader than the abuse of a
general warrant"); Cunningham, A LinguisticAnalysis of the Meaningsof "Search" in the
Fourth Amendment: A Search for Common Sense, 73 IOWA L. REV. 541, 552 (1988)
(contending that the fourth amendment contains "two constitutional mandates"-not
only does the provision ban certain types of warrants, it also generally prohibit[s]
unreasonable searches and seizures that violated the right of the people to be secure").
Thus, the fourth amendment not only prohibits intrusions which are effectuated in an
improper manner, it also bars unjustified infringements of personal sovereignty. A
general curfew law (as opposed to a temporary curfew imposed for a few hours or days
immediately following a riot or natural disaster), however, criminalizes being on the
street during curfew hours. What is the justification for this action? In effect, the
government has concluded that its interest in absolute tranquility on the streets always
outweighs any liberty interest of the individual.
In my view, the premise of a curfew law cannot be harmonized with the right of
personal security and liberty sanctioned by the first clause of the fourth amendment. The
government cannot, under the guise of preserving law and order, criminalize otherwise
innocent behavior. Cf Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979) (even assuming that the
government's interest in preventing crime is advanced by stopping and demanding
identification from a person without any specific reason for believing he or she is involved
in criminal conduct, "the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment do not allow it");
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 362 n.l (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("We have
not in recent years found a state statue invalid directly under the Fourth Amendment,
but we have long recognized that the government may not 'authorize police conduct
which trenches upon Fourth Amendment rights, regardless of the labels which it attaches
to such conduct.' ") (quoting Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 61 (1968)).
As a normative matter, walking or loitering on the street is perfectly innocent and
reasonable behavior. In fact, as the court in Waters itself recognized, "[t]he right to walk
the streets, or to meet publicly with one's friends for a noble purpose or for no purpose at
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police efficiency and effectiveness comes at the risk of sacrificing our constitutional heritage.4 2 Professor Uviller's observations regarding the attitude
displayed by cops on the street, and his descriptions of how officers perceive
their role in the criminal justice process,4" raise fundamental questions that
must be addressed if we wish to preserve our constitutional freedoms during
the nation's current unrest.
III.

POLICE DISCRETION ON THE STREET

Another controversial subject explored by Professor Uviller concerns
police discretion. In his landmark book, Police Discretion, Professor Kenneth Culp Davis demonstrates that police officers have enormous discretion:
"The police make policy about what law to enforce, how much to enforce it,
against whom, and on what occasions."' Professor Davis's study of the
Chicago Police Department also reveals that most policy decisions are made
by the officer on the beat.45 Professor Uviller appears to have no quarrel
with Professor Davis's observations on the degree of discretion exercised by
individual officers.' Indeed, Professor Uviller provides an assortment of
examples of police discretion at work.
One instance concerned Officer
all-and to do so whenever one pleases-is an integral component of life in a free and
ordered society." Waters, 711 F. Supp. at 1134. If the right to walk the streets is an
integral component of life in a free society, then one's personal security is threatened

when walking on the streets becomes a crime. When the government is permitted to seize
and arrest someone for merely being on the street-and nothing else-then the personal
security granted by the fourth amendment's first clause becomes meaningless.
42 As Justice Stewart stated in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971)
(plurality opinion):
In times of unrest, whether caused by crime or racial conflict or fear of internal
subversion, this basic law and the values that it represents may appear unrealistic or

'extravagant' to some. But the values were those of the authors of our fundamental

constitutional concepts. In times not altogether unlike our own they won-by legal

and constitutional means in England, and by revolution on this continent-a right of
personal security against arbitrary intrusions by official power. If times have

changed, reducing every man's scope to do as he pleases in an urban and industrial
world, the changes have made the values served by the Fourth Amendment more,
not less, important.
Id. at 455 (footnote omitted).
43 "[T]he cop believes deep down that he himself is most favorably positioned to
perceive the action, understand the behavior of the players, and recognize the dictates of
justice." H.R. UVILLER, supra note 6, at 24 (emphasis added).
44 K. DAVIS, POLICE DISCRETION 1 (1975).
45 Id. at 50-51. (stating that "[t]he top officers fail to make most of the policy, so that
patrolmen become the primary makers of the policy ....
No one in the department
makes special studies for the purpose of formulating policy. The policy choices are
usually based on nothing better than patrolmen's offhand judgments.").
46 See H.R. UVILLER, supra note 6, at 153 (stating that "we may begin with the fact
that police, as public officers, make many decisions based on personal judgment that no
higher authority will call wrong").

1990]

CONSTITUTION

Paddy Rogers's "truly canine ability to sniff out illegal handguns" (p. 59).47
Officer Rogers and a partner would cruise a neighborhood in an unmarked
car. Officer Rogers would focus on the hands of men on the street. Rogers
demonstrated his method to Professor Uviller:
Standing, he made an almost imperceptible motion with his hand as
though gently pulling down the front of a shirt or jacket over his belt.
"They always do it," [Rogers] explained. "Just making sure it's covered when they see us looking at them. It's involuntary. But it's all the
tip-off we need. We jump out and walk up to him fast. 'Police. Do you
have anything on you that could hurt me?' 'Only the gun, Officer.'
'Don't touch it.' We grab it, put the cuffs on him, and that's it." (p. 59).
Officer Rogers claimed that his "hit rate" was nearly ninety-seven percent
(p. 58). Professor Uviller found Rogers's "description of his method completely convincing, and the high hit rate he claimed, as well as the actual
arrest numbers, demonstrated that he and [his partner] were aiming their
moves with care" (p. 60). I am not convinced. First, I am skeptical of his
claimed high "hit rate," although, of course, I am not in a position to disprove it. But, more importantly, even if one accepts his claims of accuracy,
the constitutionality of Officer Rogers' methods are questionable, at best.49
47 Officer Rogers's talent for "sniffing out" weapons should not be confused with DEA
Agent Paul Markonni's ability to sniff out drug couriers. The court remarked in
Sentovich v. United States 677 F.2d 834 (11th Cir. 1982) that
[t]he ubiquitous DEA Agent Paul Markonni once again sticks his nose into the drug
trade.... We now learn that among Markonni's many talents is an olfactory sense
we in the past attributed only to canines. [The defendant] argues that he should
have been able to test . . . whether Markonni really is the human bloodhound he
claims to be. [The defendant's] claims, however, have more bark than bite. In fact,
they have not a dog's chance of success.
Id. at 855-36.
" Although the patrol car may have been unmarked, Officer Rogers believed that the
police presence in the neighborhood was unmistakable: " 'Let's not kid ourselves, they
knew who we were. Two white guys in a Dodge Dart-we might as well have had the red
lights flashing on the roof.'" H.R. UVILLER, supra note 6, at 59.
49 Officer Rogers' conduct would seem to be patently unconstitutional under the
standards set forth by the First Department of the Appellate Division, which is the
appellate court that has jurisdiction over the area in which Officer Rogers operates. In a
series of cases, the First Department has invalidated police searches of individuals who
were alleged to have possessed weapons in circumstances similar to the claims made by
Officer Rogers. See, e.g., People v. Howard, 147 A.D.2d 177, 181, 542 N.Y.S.2d 536, 539
(N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (holding that an undefinable bulge in a person's pocket is an
insufficient basis for a frisk); People v. Marine 142 A.D.2d 368, 370-71, 536 N.Y.S.2d
425, 427 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (holding that the behavior of the defendant, that is,
reaching under his jacket, was susceptible of innocent as well as culpable interpretation

and thus does not constitute justification for a search); People v. Ventura 139 A.D.2d
196, 207, 531 N.Y.S.2d 526, 533 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) (holding that the defendant's
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"innocuous behavior," adjusting something under his jacket, did not justify a pat-down
and search) .
Under the standards of the First Department, "reasonable suspicion" to justify a frisk
or search cannot be based on an officer's subjective beliefs that a person possesses a
weapon; nor will "innocuous" or "equivocal" behavior constitute sufficient suspicion for
a weapons search. See Howard, 147 A.D.2d at 179, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 539.
Accordingly, the First Department ruled a seizure and search unconstitutional even
though the police observed a person several times put "his right hand inside the left side
of his jacket 'as though he were adjustingsomething,' " while standing outside a subway
entrance at 10:00 p.m. in a "robbery prone" area. Officers detained the defendant, and
frisked him when they noticed a bulge in his jacket. Id. at 178-79, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 539.
The court explained that the defendant's hand movement-reaching inside his jacket
as though he was adjusting something--did not warrant a suspicion that he possessed a
weapon:
This innocuous movement was readily susceptible of an innocent interpretation. It
was an action reflective of adjusting one's clothing or suspenders or the nervous
touching of one's pocket wallet. We find that this conduct, either alone or in
conjunction with defendant's equally innocuous movements near the subway
entrance, would not constitute a founded suspicion that criminal activity was afoot.
Id. at 179-80, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 539.
In Marine, a police officer observed the defendant walking at night in a "drug prone
location." Marine, 142 A.D.2d at 369, 536 N.Y.S.2d at 425. When the defendant saw
the patrol car, he "grasped an object on the left side of his body in the vicinity of his
jacket pocket, and 'push[ed' the object up." Id. (emphasis added). A few moments later,
when the defendant was directly in front of the police vehicle, he "reached inside of his
jacket with his right hand to 'fix' an object in his left waistband." Id. (emphasis added).
The officer testified that on the basis of his training and the observation of other officers
adjusting their guns, he believed that the defendant possessed a gun. Id. The officer
stopped the defendant, and noticed "a suspicious bulge" in the area of where the defendant had been adjusting his jacket. The officer then seized a weapon from this location.
Id. at 369-70, 536 N.Y.S.2d at 426.
The First Department ruled that, even before the officer observed the suspicious bulge,
the officer did not have a reasonable basis to believe criminal conduct was present. Id. at
370, 536 N.Y.S.2d at 426. The court explained that the officer's suspicion that the
defendant possessed a weapon-based on the defendant's hand motions-was "mere
speculation." Id.
Finally, in Ventura, police officers observed the defendant and a companion walking in
a "drug prone" neighborhood. Ventura, 139 A.D.2d at 199, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 528. One of
the officers saw the defendant " 'playing inside of his jacket,' or seemingly 'fixing something' 'inside his inner jacket pocket.'" Id. The officer felt that the defendant might be
adjusting a holster. Id. A few moments later, the officers searched the defendant after
they noticed a bulge in his jacket. Id. at 200, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 529.
The court found nothing in the defendant's conduct that would warrant a suspicion of
criminal activity. Instead, the court concluded that the officer's belief that the defendant
had a gun "was absolute speculation." Id. at 207, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 523. The officer
"never observed any part of or the shape of a holster and had no independent information
that men with guns were in the vicinity. One could just as well have guessed that defendant was arranging his clothing, a wallet or some other innocuous item." Id.
If the actions of the defendants in the above cases did not warrant a reasonable suspi-
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Professor Uviller recognizes that Terry v. Ohio' ° permits police to seize
and frisk a suspect for weapons on evidence falling short of probable cause.
Terry held that the fourth amendment's general rule that searches and
seizures require probable cause would not apply to "a reasonable search for
weapons for the protection of the police officer, where he has reason to
believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless
of whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime."'" The

"stop and frisk" exception created in Terry has been expanded well beyond
anything the Warren Court might have imagined. Even under the expansive
authority now afforded the police during street encounters, however, Officer

Rogers's routine cannot pass constitutional muster.
First, it is evident that a person "approached" by Officer Rogers has been
seized for purposes of the fourth amendment. As noted earlier, a seizure
occurs where a reasonable person would believe-in light of all the surrounding circumstances-that he or she is not free to leave an officer's pres-

ence.5 2 Under this test, I think there is little doubt that when an officer

jumps out of a police vehicle and heads straight at a person shouting

"Police!" the average citizen will not feel free to ignore the officer. Officer
Rogers's actions and words convey a message of authority and potential
force.5
cion that the suspects possessed weapons, it is hard to see how the behavior observed by
Officer Rogers-a hand motion, as though "gently pulling down the front of a shirt or
jacket over [a] belt"-constitutes a reasonable belief that an individual possesses a
weapon.
I Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
5' Id. at 27.
52 See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
I Those defending the actions of Officer Rogers might claim a safe haven in the multilayered framework for assessing police encounters that the New York Court of Appeals
constructed in People v. DeBour, 40 N.Y.2d 210, 352 N.E.2d 562, 386 N.Y.S.2d 375
(1976). Under the analysis of DeBour, there are four categories in which a police
encounter might fall.
First, the police may, as a part of their "public service function," id. at 218, 352 N.E.2d
at 568, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 381, approach and put questions to a person when there is "some
objective credible reason" for an intrusion not "necessarily indicative of criminality." Id.
at 223, 352 N.E.2d at 571-72, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 381.
Second, an officer may question an individual based on the police officer's "common
law right to inquire." This degree of police conduct may be "activated by a founded
suspicion that criminal activity is afoot and permits a somewhat greater intrusion ... to
the extent necessary to gain explanatory information, but short of a forcible seizure." Id.
at 223, 352 N.E.2d at 572, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 384-85.
The third category covers police intrusions that result in forcible seizures or searches.
Id. at 223, 352 N.E.2d at 572, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 385. Here, there must be a reasonable
suspicion of criminal conduct prior to the intrusion. The final category is where the
police arrest a person if there is probable cause to believe a crime has been committed "in
his presence." Id.
One could argue that Officer Rogers is simply exercising his common law right to
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The next question is whether a slight hand motion creates a reasonable
suspicion that a person is carrying a gun. Terry explained that, even in the
case of a minor intrusion, an officer "must be able to point to specific and
articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those
facts, reasonably warrant [a police] intrusion."' From this general statement the Terry Court fashioned its holding, which contains three components: first, the observation of unusual conduct suggesting criminality;
second, identification of the officer and reasonable inquiry of the suspect; and
third, the absence of any conduct which would dispel an officer's initial fears
that the suspect was armed and currently dangerous.5 5
If Officer Rogers's conduct is to pass constitutional muster, we must
accept the claim that all men standing on city sidewalks who tug at their
shirts or jackets whenever a patrol car cruises by may be carrying weapons
and are thus currently dangerous. Such a notion is hardly self-evident.
Terry and its progeny require "specific and articulable facts" which support
a reasonable conclusion of criminal conduct.' Officer Rogers only observed
a slight hand motion. His belief that this movement is evidence of weapon
possession is sheer speculation. 7 He has not seen any describable object that
inquire when he bounds out of his patrol car and says "'Police. Do you have anything
on you that could hurt me?'" H.R. UVILLER, supra note 6, at 59. Following this logic,
it is the suspect's response, "'Only the gun, Officer,'" which provides Officer Rogers
reasonable grounds for a frisk.
Although I believe that the DeBour analysis is at odds with fourth amendment
principles, see Maclin, The Decline of the Right of Locomotion: The Fourth Amendment
on the Streets, CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming), even if one were to agree that this
approach is consistent with fourth amendment values, it seems reasonable to conclude
that a forcible detention has occurred as soon as Officer Rogers approaches a suspect and
yells "Police!" At this point, Officer Rogers has only seen a slight hand motion, and thus,
has no basis for a detention.
-' Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 (footnote omitted).
55 The following is the exact language of the Court:
We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which
leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may
be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently
dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as
a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages
of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he
is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully
limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover
weapons which might be used to assault him.
Id. at 30 (emphasis added).
56 It is true that Terry upheld a frisk even though the officer never saw any outline or
bulge indicative of a weapon before he frisked Terry and his two companions. The search
in Terry, however, was justified because the defendants' actions-pacing past a store
window over a dozen times-and their response to the officer's request for
identification-"mumbl[ing] something"-suggested that the defendants were about to
commit a robbery. Id. at 6-7.
57

See supra note 49.
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suggests possession of a gun, nor has he observed any suspicious waistband
bulge,'8 and he has not seen the outline or any part of a gun." a
Nor has Officer Rogers observed any describable conduct that supports a
reasonable basis for his belief that the citizens he stops are carrying guns.
Certainly Officer Rogers' targets have engaged in no overt conduct indicative
of criminal activity, unless standing on the street has become a felony. If a
slight hand motion is indicative of gun possession, what about a young man
who closes the buttons or zipper on his jacket when the police cruise by? He
too could be "[j]ust making sure" that a weapon is covered-up when the
police drive past. Or, consider a group standing on the street who turn their
backs to the police cruiser. They also must be trying to hide something from
the police-why else would they turn their backs?
Although some may find Officer Rogers' method "completely convincing"
(p. 60), sanctioning such conduct grants enormous discretion to the police
on a slim reed of justification. While Officer Rogers claims that he detects
unusual conduct from "an almost imperceptible motion" of a suspect's hand
6
(p. 59), his conclusions are speculative at best, and subject to manipulation. 0
There are simply too many other reasons why a person might tug at his or
her shirt to allow such conduct to trigger intrusive police seizures and
searches.61
Officer Rogers might insist that this attitude is naive. He might argue that
in his precinct, men on the street who tug at their shirts when a cop cruises
by are not likely adjusting their suspenders. Should Officer Rogers's "common sense" be sufficient to sanction these intrusions? What is the upshot of
this kind of reasoning? While the criminal character of a neighborhood will

m DeBour, 40 N.Y.2d at 221, 352 N.E.2d at 570, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 383 (noting that
"[t]he location of [a] bulge is noteworthy because unlike a pocket bulge which could be
caused by any number of innocuous objects, a waistband bulge is telltale of a weapon").
59 See People v. Prochilo, 41 N.Y.2d 759, 762, 363 N.E.2d 1380, 1381, 395 N.Y.S.2d
635, 636 (1977) (noting that an officer is warranted in acting on a belief that the
defendant had a gun when he saw the defendant make hand motions toward his side and
observed the outline of a revolver through the defendant's clothing").
6o Cf Cloud, Search And Seizure By The Numbers: The Drug Courier Profile And
Judicial Review Of Investigative Formulas, 65 B.U.L. REV. 843, 890 (1985). Professor
Cloud describes how some police claims of suspicious behavior are extremely subjective
and not subject to meaningful judicial review. For example, one of the alleged
characteristics shared by drug couriers is "looking around" or making eye contact.
Professor Cloud notes that a
court can easily verify the suspect's age or time of arrival, but it has no reliable way
of determining whether or not a suspect actually made eye contact with the agent or
looked around the airport in some unusual way. This characteristic allows the
agents maximum discretion, because their conclusions are essentially unreviewable.
Id. (emphasis added).
61 See supra note 49.
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always be a factor in assessing police conduct, 2 this factor cannot act as a
bootstrap to justify otherwise arbitrary police behavior.
Citizens who live in crime prone areas are entitled to the same constitutional protection as those who live in more affluent areas. The police in the
suburbs do not usually have similar reactions to the young men they observe
hanging out in parking lots. And as stated by the New York Appellate Division, "[t]he reputation of a location, however notorious, does not provide a
predicate for subversion of the Fourth Amendment."'6 Although residents
of poor, crime plagued neighborhoods are the most likely victims of street
crime, citizens of these devasted regions also remain the most vulnerable to
aggressive, low visibility patrol tactics. The protection afforded
by the
4
fourth amendment should not depend on one's street address.
It is also arguable that Officer Rogers's actions do not satisfy the spirit, if
not the letter, of Terry's other requirements. If an officer is given the authority to frisk, the Court should not over-regulate the decision.6" On the other
hand, Terry's requirement that an officer identify herself and pose questions
that might allow a suspect to explain away his suspicious behavior becomes
meaningless if the constitutional standard can be satisfied in a case where a
suspect has no realistic chance to respond to the officer's inquiries or dispel
her fears.
Perhaps officers should not be required to wait for a suspect to explain socalled "suspicious" hand motions; maybe being a cop in New York City is
just too dangerous to limit police discretion during street encounters.6 The
Court, however, has never openly endorsed such a position. Until the Court
62
63

See Howard, 147 A.D.2d at 182, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 540.
Marine, 142 A.D.2d at 372, 536 N.Y.S.2d at 422.

14 See Howard, 147 A.D.2d at 182, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 540 (stating that "[a] citizen is
certainly entitled to stand and look about for two or three minutes on a street comer, in
any neighborhood, and be free from arbitrary police encounters").
65 In a concurring opinion in Terry, Justice Harlan maintained that "a limited frisk
incident to a lawful stop must often be rapid and routine. There is no reason why an
officer, rightfully but forcibly confronting a person suspected of a serious crime, should
have to ask one question and take the risk that the answer might be a bullet." Terry, 392
U.S. at 33 (Harlan, J., concurring). Although the Terry majority did not endorse this
view, a majority of the Court subsequently seems to have accepted Justice Harlan's view
that the authority to frisk does not require that an officer first allow a suspect to explain
away his suspicious behavior. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145-48 (1972)
(upholding immediate frisk of suspect, although no gun was visible, where officer received
a tip from an informant that defendant possessed narcotics and had a gun at his waist).
But see id. at 155 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that "[t]he facts are clear that the
officer intended to make the search as soon as he approached the respondent. He asked
no questions; he made no investigation; he simply searched.").
66 There was a time when New York police officers' authority to search was automatic
whenever they stopped a person. See Schwartz, Stop And Frisk (A Case Study in Judicial
Controlof the Police), 58 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE Sci. 433, 442, 444 (1967).
Terry and its companion cases, however, were decided to stop this trend. See Sibron v.
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does sanction such a view, Officer Rogers's methods should comport with
fourth amendment standards. Police intrusions, even ones that claim to be
highly successful, should not escape constitutional scrutiny because they
appear "absurdly simple" (p. 59).
A.

The Constitutionalityof the "Subarrest"

Another example of police discretion replete with constitutional questions
concerns the legality of investigative seizures, similar to the type involved in
Davis v. Mississippi67 and Hayes v. Florida.' Professor Uviller describes how
some 9 RIP officers believe there is a constitutional distinction between
"picking up" a suspect in order to place him in a lineup, and "locking up" a
suspect who has been positively identified in a corporeal lineup. Sergeant
Browne explained the difference as follows:
At a lineup, I wouldn't lock anybody up on less than 90 percent sure.
But I'd go out and pick a suspect up on a lot less than that on the photo
ID. I have to go out and bring that person in here for the lineup, and
any halfway decent indication from the photos, or anything else, will do
for starters. But that's not the arrest, you understand. For the arrest, I
want a lineup if at all possible. (p. 77).
As Professor Uviller recognizes, Sergeant Browne and the other 9 RIP
officers are confused about basic principles of fourth amendment law-there
is no constitutional distinction between "picking up" and "locking up" a
suspect. Indeed, any involuntary removal of a suspect from a place where he
is entitled to be to a police station for investigative purposes, constitutes a
seizure under the fourth amendment.6'
Although the 9 RIP officers may have been mistaken about the constitutional implications of "picking up" a suspect, Professor Uviller aptly
observes that the police may end up in a legal straitjacket if they obey constitutional requirements: "How can conscientious cops obtain the corp ID
New York, 392 U.S. 40, 64 (1968) (stating that "[tihe police officer is not entitled to seize
and search every person whom he sees on the street or of whom he makes inquiries").
67 Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 726-27 (1969) (holding that the fourth
amendment applies to involuntary detentions occurring at the investigatory as well as the
accusatory stage of police conduct).
6 Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 815 (1985) (affirming "the holding in Davis that
transportation to and investigative detention at the station house without probable cause
or judicial authorization violates the Fourth Amendment").
69 As stated in Hayes:
[O]ur view continues to be that the [constitutional] line is crossed when, the police,
without probable cause or a warrant, forcibly remove a person from his home or
other place in which he is entitled to be and transport him to the police station,
where he is detained, although briefly, for investigative purposes. We adhere to the
view that such seizures, at least where not under judicial supervision, are sufficiently
like arrests to invoke the traditional rule that arrests may constitutionally be made
only on probable cause.
Id. at 816 (footnote omitted).
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without a seizure of the suspect? If police believe they need a corp ID for a
valid arrest, and arrest must be made to obtain a lineup, we have the makings of the proverbial Catch 22." (p. 80).
One solution to this dilemma is to agree that the cops have probable cause
based on a tenative photo ID. Such a solution might satisfy current constitutional standards. In Illinois v. Gates,7 . the Court explained that probable
cause requires only a" 'probability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity.' ,7' Although Gates arose in a context where the police
obtained a warrant, there are good reasons to believe that the rationale of
Gates equally applies to non-warrant settings.72 If so, it is arguable that the
police have probable cause for arrest when a suspect is identified in a photo
display.
On the other hand, there are problems with this approach. Even if a tentative photo ID satisfies constitutional standards, why should a conscientious
police officer rush out to arrest a suspect if the officer is not convinced that a
witness has identified the perpetrator of the crime? As Professor Uviller
notes, the "consequences of initiating a criminal prosecution are considerable" (p. 79). For the person arrested, the experience of arrest and detention
not only constitutes a "serious personal intrusion, ' 73 but also may cause an
enormous disruption of family and work life.
Professor Uviller proposes another solution to the Catch 22 confronting
the police. He suggests that
[p]erhaps the law and the Constitution should recognize and approve a
relatively low standard for the brief and minor intrusion entailed in
compulsory attendance at a lineup. Perhaps something better than
hunch but far less than 50-50 certainty-call it reasonable groundsmight satisfy both the fourth amendment and the requirements of the
investigation. (p. 79).74
70

71

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
Gates, 462 U.S. at 235 (quoting Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419 (1969)),

72 See Kamisar, Gates, "Probable Cause, " "Good Faith," and Beyond, 69 IOWA L.
REV. 551, 582-84 (1984) (arguing that "it will be a great feat ...to convince the Court

that handed down Gates that its decision is, or should be, limited" to the search warrant

context).
73 United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 428 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring).
74 It should be noted that although Professor Uviller uses the term "reasonable

grounds" to describe the quantum of evidence that might be needed to justify his
proposed "sub-arrest" detention, he would not require that the police possess evidence
sufficient to satisfy the fourth amendment's probable cause standard. The terms
"reasonable grounds," "reasonable cause," and "probable cause," however, are
sometimes used interchangeably. See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949)
(" 'The substance of all the definitions' of probable cause 'is a reasonable ground for belief
of guilt.' ") (quoting McCarthy v. De Armit, 99 Pa. 63, 69 (1881)); Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 160 (1925) (stating that agents had "reasonable cause" to believe
that defendants were illegally transporting liquor).
Professor Uviller's proposal could be read to suggest that the traditional probable
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Professor Uviller suggests that the answer to the police dilemma is a judicial order that permits a "sub-arrest" detention (p. 84). This order would be
"a warrant of sorts that allows physical submission but not interrogation.
Although the order requires the suspect to present his body without his consent, it is not deemed the functional equivalent of an arrest and hence probably need not be predicated on probable cause." (p. 84). The police could use
this procedure to inspect and examine a suspect's characteristics, including
his facial features, fingerprints, footprint, voiceprint, bodily fluids, hair samples (p. 84) and maybe-when the technology is considered reliable and
made available to the local stationhouse-his DNA print.
The constitutional validity of the "sub-arrest" detention proposed by Professor Uviller-even one authorized by a judicial order-has never been
definitively addressed bythe Supreme Court.7" Such a detention surely constitutes a "seizure" for fourth amendment purposes.76 The Court, however,
has been ambivalent about whether such intrusions are valid without probable cause or judicial warrant.
In dicta, Davis v. Mississippi suggested that even if the police lacked probable cause, an investigatory detention at the police station for the sole purpose of obtaining a suspect's fingerprints might be constitutional if
authorized by judicial warrant.77 Davis, however, was a narrow ruling. The
cause standard requires evidence that would satisfy a prima facie or more-likely-than-not
test. While probable cause may have required that degree of evidence in the past, Gates
made plain that this was no longer true. In Gates the Court statedthat "it is clear that
'only the probability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity is the standard
of probable cause.'" Gates, 462 U.S. at 235 (quoting Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S.
410, 419 (1969)). See also Gates, 462 U.S. at 244 n.13 (stating that probable cause
"requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual
showing of such activity").
11 The New York Court of Appeals, in In re Abe A., 56 N.Y.2d 288, 437 N.E.2d265,
452 N.Y.S.2d 6 (1982), upheld a judicial order that required a suspect to supply a blood
sample for scientific analysis in a criminal investigation. The Court of Appeals ruled that
a court order may issue where there is probable cause to believe a suspect has committed
the crime; a clear indication that relevant material evidence will be found; and the
method used to secure the evidence is safe and reliable. Id.at 291, 452 N.E.2d at 260, 452
N.Y.S.2d at 7.
76 Any detention that restrains an individual's freedom of movement amounts to a
fourth amendment seizure. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968) (stating that "[it is
quite plain that the Fourth Amendment governs 'seizures' of the person which do not
eventuate in a trip to the station house and prosecution for crime-'arrests' in traditional
terminology"). See also Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 726-27 (1969).
77 Speaking for the Court, Justice Brennan explained that because of the "unique
nature of the fingerprinting process," an exception to the usual requirement of probable
cause might be appropriate. Davis, 394 U.S. at 727. Several features make a detention for
fingerprinting unlike other investigatory seizures: fingerprinting does not require
"probing into an individual's private life and thoughts that marks an interrogation or
search." Id. The fingerprinting process also does not lend itself to abuse, "since the
police need only one set of each person's prints." Id. Fingerprinting is a "more reliable"
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Court found the seizure unconstitutional because the police detained Davis
without judicial authorization, subjected Davis to two fingerprinting sessions, and interrogated Davis during one of the detentions. 78
Despite Davis's holding and the limited exception suggested by its dicta,
the Court subsequently indicated a willingness to widen the narrow exception that surfaced in Davis. Hayes v. Florida79 made clear that the fourth
amendment does not permit forcibly removing and transporting a person to
a police station for investigative purposes.8 0 But Hayes did suggest, again in
dicta, that an on-site fingerprinting procedure might pass constitutional
muster if there is reasonable suspicion that a suspect has committed a
crime.8 '
Thus, the current Court apparently draws a distinction between on-site
fingerprinting and fingerprinting conducted at the police station. The latter
procedure requires a judicial order, whereas the former may be conducted
without any judicial supervision at all. The questions that remain are
whether this distinction is truly justified, and, if so, whether it is applicable
to other investigatory seizures.
The Court has not explained why on-site fingerprinting does not need
judicial authorization, and fingerprinting at the station does. Obviously, the
latter seizure involves removing a suspect from one place and taking him to
procedure than eyewitness identifications or confessions, and is not subject to the abuse
inherent in an improper line-up or custodial interrogation. Id. Finally, because there is
no danger of destruction, there is no exigency requiring an immediate police seizure.
Thus, "the general requirement that the authorization of a judicial officer be obtained in
advance of detention would seem not to admit of any exception in the fingerprinting
context." Id. at 728.
78 Id. at 728.
79 Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811 (1985)
80 Id. at 816.
81 Speaking for the Court, Justice White drew support for this novel view from
language in two previous cases, Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972) and United
States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 (1985). In Williams, the Court noted that a "brief stop of
a suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo
momentarily while obtaining more information, may be most reasonable in light of the
facts known to the officer at the time." Williams, 407 U.S. at 146. In Hensley, the Court
relied upon the above dicta from Williams to observe that police may, in reliance upon a
flyer issued by another police department, stop a person to check identification, pose
questions, or "detain [a]person briefly while attempting to obtain further information,"
provided the flyer was issued on the basis of reasonable suspicion. Hensley, 469 U.S. at

232.
According to Justice White, Williams and Hensley supported the view that the fourth
amendment permits fingerprinting "if there is reasonable suspicion that the suspect has
committed a criminal act, if there is a reasonable basis for believing that fingerprinting
will establish or negate the suspect's connection with that crime, and if the procedure is
carried out with dispatch." Hayes, 470 U.S. at 817. Justice White stated, however, that
no amount of objective evidence would allow a "warrantless entry into a person's house
for the purpose of obtaining fingerprint identification." Id.
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the police station. But on-site fingerprinting also requires disruption of a
suspect's liberty, since the suspect will presumably, be seized and removed to
wherever the police plan to conduct the procedure, which is not likely to
occur at a place that pleases the suspect.

All things considered, unauthor-

ized on-site fingerprinting seems just as intrusive as being seized and taken
downtown on the basis of a judicial order. From the individual's perspective, both scenarios invade the right to freedom of movement, and seriously
violate personal security. While, on-site fingerprinting may require less time,
2
the intrusiveness of a police procedure does not depend on its duration.
Unwarranted interruptions of one's freedom of movement are unconstitutional because "forced contacts with those looking for damaging information
are not merely highly unpleasant but deeply disturbing to one's sense of
security.""
Moreover, if prior judicial approval is necessary for the station house procedure because the Court is worried that the process "would subject unlimited numbers of innocent persons to the harassment and ignominy incident
to involuntary detentions," ' does not on-site fingerprinting present the same
risks? 5 Certainly, the criteria set out in Hayes do not alleviate the risk that
on-site fingerprinting will subject "unlimited numbers of innocent persons"
See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 722 n.2 (1983) (Blackmun, J., concurring)
("The duration and intrusiveness of the seizure is not altered by the diligence the police
82

exercise."); People v. DeBour, 40 N.Y.2d 210, 232, 352 N.E.2d 562, 578, 386 N.Y.S.2d

375, 390 (1976) (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting) ("[T]he proscription of the Fourth
Amendment is not dependent on the length of the detention. The liberty it guarantees is
not quantitative; its essence is qualitative.").
83 DeBour, 40 N.Y.2d at 232, 352 N.E.2d at 578, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 391 (Fuchsberg, J.,
dissenting).
84 Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 726 (1969).
85 On the other hand, because on-site fingerprinting requires only a brief detention and
is concerned with '.evidence" that holds no privacy content, cf Davis, 394 U.S. at 730
(Stewart, J., dissenting) (distinguishing fingerprints from conventional types of evidence),
such a procedure arguably implicates no fourth amendment privacy interests. Cf United
States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14 (1973) (holding that a person who receives a grand jury
subpoena to provide a voice exemplar has no reasonable expectation that others will not
know the sound of his voice); United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19 (1973) (holding that no
fourth amendment privacy expectation is implicated by a grand jury subpoena to provide
handwriting exemplars).
However, the Court's recognition that even brief intrusions on the street trigger fourth
amendment protection forecloses this argument. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16
(1968). Moreover, removing on-site fingerprinting from fourth amendment scrutiny
seems to place an unduly crabbed interpretation on one's freedom of movement. See
Maclin, Constructing Fourth Amendment Principles From The Government Perspective:
Whose Amendment Is It, Anyway?, 25 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 669, 689 n.119 (1988)
[hereinafter Maclin, Whose Amendment]. Indeed, the current Court's continuing
emphasis on privacy values has obscured the public travel values the fourth amendment
also protects. See Maclin, supra note 53.
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to an embarrassing and intrusive procedure.'m In fact, it seems reasonable to
ask why the police would ever bother seeking judicial authorization if they
can accomplish the same result-with less time and hassle-by simply seizing and fingerprinting a suspect they find on the street.
A final consideration is the extent to which on-site investigatory procedures can be used in contexts other than fingerprinting. As Professor Uviller
notes, the "sub-arrest" detention can be useful in obtaining fingerprints,
footprints, blood, saliva, hair samples (p. 84), and even a DNA print. The
criteria required by the Hayes dictum pose no obstacles to similar on-site
detentions to obtain this type of evidence.
B.

Do "Sub-arrest" Detentions Result in "Sub-Class" Citizens?

Despite the Hayes criteria, crucial questions remain unaddressed. Indeed,
society should contemplate these issues before it endorses the idea of police
officers rounding up suspects in order to collect saliva or hair samples without judicial supervision. The primary issue is whether fourth amendment
rights will be respected if the police are given the power discussed in Hayes.
Arguably, granting the police more power to conduct sub-arrest detentions-whether they be at the police station or on the street-will solve our
current law enforcement problems. But this may create more problems than
it solves.
There is a real danger that some of these measures will have an unintended backlash. The "current mood" of society reflects a certain naivet6 in
its unspoken confidence that innocent persons will not be subjected to the
88 Hayes ruled that on-site fingerprinting is permissible if three factors are present.

First, a "reasonable suspicion that the suspect has committed a criminal act." Second, a

"reasonable basis for believing that fingerprinting will establish or negate the suspect's
connection with that crime." Third, the assurance that the procedure will be "carried out
with dispatch." Hayes, 470 U.S. at 817. As explained elsewhere, see Maclin, Whose
Amendment, siupra note 85, at 688 n. 118, these factors provide little fourth amendment

protection.
As an initial matter, when the Court speaks of a "reasonable suspicion" it is not clear
whether this requires individualizedsuspicion regarding the person seized, or merely that
government officials act reasonably. Cf Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 109
S. Ct. 1402, 1417 (1989) ("[A] showing of individualized suspicion is not a constitutional
floor, below which a search must be presumed unreasonable."); New Jersey v. T.L.O.,
469 U.S. 325, 341-343 (1985) (leaving open the question of whether individualized
suspicion is required in- the "reasonable grounds" standard used to assess
constitutionality of searches conducted by school officials; it is sufficient if authorities
acted "according to the dictates of reason and common sense").
The second and third factors set out in Hayes provide little guidance to the police and
no protection to the suspect. "Fingerprinting, by definition, will generally establish or
refute a suspect's connection with a particular crime. This fact, however, does not

provide an objective justification for seizing a particular individual." Maclin, Whose
Amendment, supra note 85, at 689 n. 118. Finally, the requirement that the investigatory

procedure be "carried out with dispatch" provides no check on arbitrary police conduct.
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expanded police measures now being urged, or that society is willing to pay
the price of fewer protections in order to fight crime. The "current mood"
of society, however, plays no part in the determination of fourth amendment
protections since these rights apply to everyone at once, law-abiding citizens
as well as suspected criminals, and are in a very significant way a
countermajoritarian check against the possibly dangerous and discriminatory "moods" of the majority.
Before society, in an effort to take almost any step to help fight crimeparticularly drug related crime,8 7 rushes to embrace the "sub-arrest" procedure, it should recall some recent history. Forgotten in the current hyperbolic discussion about crime and -constitutional rights is our experience with
'a police procedure that caused much controversy in the 1960's, and has
again taken center stage in some communities-the stop and frisk. Indeed,
the history of the stop and frisk can teach society much about investigatory
measures that seem so necessary today.
Stop and frisk often has been abused by the police.88 This is particularly
so when the police are energized by a horrible crime.8 9 In theory, the stop
and frisk, like an investigatory detention for fingerprinting, or sub-arrest to
collect a hair sample, seems perfectly reasonable. The reality of this procedure, however, is that police discretion is uncontrolled, and the brunt of
enforcement activity falls on the poor and minorities. These are facts that
the Court has refused to address.
1.

Police Discretion Cannot Be Checked

First, the police seizures sanctioned in Hayes cannot be harmonized with
traditional fourth amendment values. When it comes to street encounters, a
demand for "specificity" is the constitutional bulwark that prevents the
police from exercising "dictatorial power" over the streetsf If the police,
87

The Washington Post reported that 62 percent of those surveyed in a recent poll

"said they would be willing to give up 'a few of the freedoms we have in this country' to
significantly reduce illegal drug use," and 52 percent said "they would agree to let the
police search homes of suspected drug dealers without a court order, even if the houses
'of people like you were sometimes searched by mistake.'" Morin, Many in Poll Say
Bush Plan Is Not Stringent Enough, The Wash. Post, Sept. 8, 1989, at Al, col. 5.
8 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 14 n. 11 (refering to'a government report documenting the
friction between the police and minority community caused by field interrogations);
Amsterdam, supra note 16, at 405 (describing the need for constitutional restraints to
lessen the discriminatory'use of the police powers approved in Terry); Schwartz, supra
note 66, at 443-44 (contending that police use the frisk as a pretext to seek evidence; to
confiscate weapons; and to establish their authority over the streets).
89 See infra notes 91-98 and accompanying text; Philadelphia to Pay Damages to

Detainees, N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1989, at A18, col. 1 (reporting that the City of
Philadelphia agreed to pay a total of $50,000 to 336 black men who were
unconstitutionally stopped and frisked during a police hunt for a black man reported to
have sexually assaulted young women).
I See Amsterdam, Federal ConstitutionalRestrictions On the Punishmentof Crimes of
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however, are free to fingerprint persons who fit a generalized description of a
criminal assailant, or permitted to frisk youths who appear to be members of
local gangs, then the requirement of specificity is no longer meaningful.
A tragic and controversial case in Boston illustrates how constitutional
freedoms can be lost when society responds aggressively to a horrible crime.
On October 24, 1989, a white couple, Carol and Charles Stuart, were found
shot after attending a birthing class at a hospital in the Mission Hill section
of Roxbury, a predominately black neighborhood. 9' The initial description
given of the alleged assailant was that he was a black male, about 6-feet tall
and approximately 30 years old. 92 After the shooting, many black men were
stopped, questioned and searched by police, often in blatant disregard of
constitutional norms.9 The shooting also brought renewed interest in (and
support for)94 the Boston Police policy of indiscriminately stopping and
frisking members of youth gangs. 95
Status, Crimes of General Obnoxiousness,. Crimes of DispleasingPolice Officers, and the
Like, 3 CRIM. L. BULL. 205, 223 (1967) (stating that the "reasonable account"
requirement of vagrancy laws "operates simply as a charter of dictatorial power to the
policeman").
91 Carol Stuart, several months pregnant, was found shot in the head. She died the
next day. Her premature boy, who was delivered by Caesarean section shortly after the
shooting, died 17 days later. Charles Stuart had a gun shot wound to the abdomen, but
managed to survive the shooting. Jacobs, Stuart is said to view photos of suspects, Boston
Globe, Nov. 22, 1989, at 17, col. 1.
92 This general description was later updated to include the following: the alleged
assailant was described "as a black male in his late 20's or early 30's, about 5 feet 10
inches tall and weighing 150 to 160 pounds." Kierstead, A policy on printing suspects'
descriptions, Boston Globe, Nov.'13, 1989, at 15, col. 2 (quoting Jacobs & Ribadeneria,
No wallet, so killer opened fire, Boston Globe, October 26, 1989, at 1, col. 2-3). It was
also revealed that the assailant was "wearing a black baseball hat and a black running suit
with several red stripes down the sleeves." Id.
93 Thomas, Mission hill wants action over searches, Boston Globe, Feb. 9, 1990, at 1,
col. 1 (describing Mission Hill residents' resentment over searches of young black men
after the Stuart murder, many of whom did not even closely resemble the description
Charles Stuart gave of his assailant); Canellos, Youths decry search tactics, Boston Globe,
Jan. 14, 1990, at 1, col. 1 (describing how several black youths were stopped and searched
in "wide variety of situations" without any apparent connection to the suspect wanted in
the Stuart shooting).
94 See, e.g., Lupo, Balancing rights, Boston Globe, Oct. 31 1989, at 15, col. 6 (stating
that "those living in a state of siege need protection. They need cops dealing aggressively
with the irrational, uncaring, impassive, insensitive thugs who have ripped the
Constitution to threads. Stop-and-frisk may be the necessary burden to counter
terrorism."). But cf Jackson, Search policy ill conceived, Boston Globe, Oct..27, 1989, at
13, col. 1 ("By calling for search on sight, by abdicating control of neighborhoods to the
police, supporters are painting a degraded image of themselves. They are arguing that
African Americans live in a barbaric state, in need of a set of separate and segregated
laws.").
95 Regarding this policy, one Boston Police official was quoted as saying: "People are
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The description provided in the Stuart case is a slim reed to support-for
example-on-site fingerprinting of tall, black men in their late 20's or early
30's found in Roxbury. There are hundreds of persons who fit that description. Any investigative detention, including police forcibly stopping and
questioning young black men,' based on this description would run afoul of
the constitutional requirement of specificity.9 7 Indeed, amidst public furor
and pressure to find the killer, the events in the Stuart case took a bizarre
turn. Several weeks after the attack and after the police had produced several suspects, one of whom Mr. Stuart identified in a lineup as the assailant,
new developments led the police to focus on Mr. Stuart himself. And, just as
the police were prepared to arrest Mr. Stuart, he committed suicide.9"
Yet, it can be argued that the standards of Hayes, or the procedure proposed by Professor Uviller, 0 would sanction the dragnet procedures that
occurred immediately after the shooting."0° The same can be said about the
policy of stopping and frisking suspected gang members. When the Boston
police detained and searched several black men after the Stuart shooting, one
could argue that these detentions were permissible because the intrusions
were based on a "reasonable" suspicion, or one could say that they were
going to say we're violating their [gang members'] constitutional rights, but we're not too
If we have to violate their rights, if that's what it takes, then
concerned about that ....
that's what we're going to do." Murphy, 5 File lawsuit challenging Boston police on
search policy, Boston Globe, Nov. 22, 1989, at 20, col. 3.
9 One young resident of Roxbury described how he felt after being questioned twice
by the police in the aftermath of the Stuart shooting: " 'I'm tired of the cops hassling me
just cause I happen to be hanging out here with my friends .... It's like all of us are bad
guys. I'm not in a gang. I'm not a drug dealer. I just live here. I'm scared just like
everyone else. But I don't have the money to escape to a nice neighborhood. I'm
stuck.' " Jacobs & Ribadeneira, supra note 92, at 11, col. 3.
9 "Th[e] demand for specificity in the information upon which police action is
predicated is the central teaching of this Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence."
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 n.18 (1968) (citations omitted).
98 See Hays, Husband of Slain Boston Woman Becomes a Suspect, Then a Suicide,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1990, at Al, col 1.
99 See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
100 For example, what if the police had discovered a fingerprint in the Stuart case that
presumably belonged to the assailant? Armed with the description that the suspect was a
tall black male in his late 20's or early 30's, weighing between 150 and 160 pounds, could
the police have conducted on-site fingerprinting of all those fitting this description in the
neighborhood where the crime occurred? If individual suspicion is not a central element
of the criteria set out in Hayes, then the only check on the police is that they act
"according to the dictates of reason and common sense." New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S.
325, 343 (1985).
If this is the operative standard, then it seems reasonable for the police to seize and
fingerprint any young black male in Roxbury who is tall, of average weight, and appears
to be between 25 and 35 years old. Indeed, because the assailant is not likely to show his
face in the neighborhood where the shooting occurred, it might be reasonable to seize and
fingerprint all black males fitting this description seen anywhere in the City of Boston.
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illegal because the police only had a hunch or acted arbitrarily. If the police
believe that gangs are armed, how can an officer distinguish between groups
of teenagers that might possess weapons and groups of teenagers that are
simply "hanging out" on the street? As one commentator has put it
"[s]uspicion involves so low a degree of belief and so subjective a judgment
that it is impossible ...
to draw a line between a 'mere' suspicion and a
'reasonable' suspicion."10' As a result, the cops too often rely on their bias
and subjectivity in deciding who should be stopped and searched. The evidence in Boston-both anecdotal and official 1 02-" 'points to the fact that
young black males are still being stopped and searched indiscriminately.' "103
The standards provided by the Court do little to discourage such activities.
In retrospect, Justice Douglas was right in Terry: "To give the police
greater power than a magistrate is to take a long step down the totalitarian
path."' ' 4 Once the Court decided to open the door to police seizures on less
than probable cause, the momentum for creation of further exceptions was
too much for the Court to withstand. 105 The Court cannot have it both
ways. It must either respect the dictates of the fourth amendment and say
that street seizures based on reasonable suspicion (whatever that means) are
unconstitutional, or concede that constitutional liberty is not worth the burden it imposes on law enforcement activities.
2. Is the Fourth Amendment Applicable in Poor, Black
Neighborhoods?
The second problem with sub-arrest detentions is the impact this procedure has on the fourth amendment rights of disfavored classes. As the
nation learned, 'there was no black assailant in the Stuart case. 1° 6 It was a
hoax that was allowed to survive-in large part-due to institutional and
societal racism. Assume for a moment, however, that the Stuarts were shot
by a black male, and the only description the police had was that the perpetrator was tall, in his late 20's and wore a black running-suit with red stripes.
Assume also the Boston Police apprehend the assailant after having
101 Schwartz, supra note 66, at 445.

See Murphy, supra note 95, at 17, col. 1.
103 Walker, Illegal search victims urged to file complaints, Boston Globe, Nov. 16,
102

1989, at 47, col. 2 (quoting Louis Elisa, president of the Boston branch of the NAACP).
See also Thomas, supra note 93 (describing incidents of black males who bore little
resemblance to the alleged assailant being stopped and searched by the police); Canellos,
supra note 93 (same).
'" Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 38 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
105 "There have been powerful hydraulic pressures throughout our history that bear
heavily on the Court to water down constitutional guarantees and give the police the
upper hand. That hydraulic pressure has probably never been greater than it is today."

Id. at 39.
IoI. Cullen, Murphy & Barnicle, Stuart dies in jump off Tobin Bridge after police are

told he killed his wife," Boston Globe, Jan. 5, 1990, at 1, col. 1.
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detained, searched and questioned many black men. If the fourth amendment is of any value, this type of police conduct must be condemned.
It is easy to criticize the Boston Police Department when it turns out that
they guessed wrong. The Boston Police, however, deserve censure for their
actions after the Stuart shooting even if there had been a "real" black perpetrator. Fourth amendment intrusions cannot "be made legal by what [they]
turn[] up. In law it is good or bad when it starts and does not change character from its success."'" When the Boston Police went into the Mission
Hill area and began seizing, questioning and searching (and in some incidents, strip-searching). 8 black males on the slim description provided by
Charles Stuart, their actions were bad from the start. Obviously a horrible
crime had been committed. Obviously the public wanted the killer apprehended. But, as Judge (later Chief Justice) Vinson noted many years ago,
police officers "should not be encouraged to proceed in an irregular manner
on the chance that all will end well."'" Such behavior cannot be justified.
Rounding up and detaining black males is an old (and unconstitutional)
police habit. Sometimes the courts and society turn a blind eye to this process when a high-profile crime has terrorized the community. But giving
cops free rein to stop and frisk, fingerprint, or detain and question, on the
loose criteria currently being articulated by the Court, has side-effects that
should concern all citizens who believe in the rule of law rather than the rule
of officials.
First, the wrong message is given to the police. After a high-profile crime
occurs where the assailant is alleged to be black and the victims white, the
police are sometimes energized to undertake an aggressive investigation.
Loose criteria permit the police to go into inner city neighborhoods to stop,
question, detain, and search black men, based soley on their skin color.
Such aggressive police tactics would not be tolerated by the residents of
white suburbs and should not be tolerated by the Court. Moreover, there is
101 United States v. DiRe, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948) (footnote omitted). Just as an

illegal police seizure does not "change character from its success," it does not change
character from its failure either.
108 A recent Boston Globe article described incidents where two young Roxbury
residents were subjected to strip searches by the police. See Canellos, supra note 93, at

22, col. 3-4. The first youth, who reported being searched in front Madison Park High
School, stated:
"[The police] asked me for my full name, my nickname, my mother's name, my
father's name, if I was ever convicted of anything. They stripped me. They pulled
off my jacket. They made me take off my pants. They checked pants. It was awful,

like I was a criminal, which I'm not. I'm a B student at an exam school. I should be
treated as an adult."
Id. The second youth, who reported being searched while walking with two friends,
stated: "[The police] were searching us and one of my friends said, 'What are you doing?'
They said, 'Shut up and pull your pants down." I said, 'What?' They made me pull my

underwear'down, too. There were like four to six people watching." Id.
109 Nueslein v. District of Columbia, 115 F.2d 690, 694 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
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reason to believe these tactics will undermine police effectiveness in poor and
minority neighborhoods.11
The sub-arrest procedures carried out by the Boston Police and other
police departments send an unmistakable message to black men, particularly
young black men-if you challenge a cop, there will trouble. Anyone who
has been involved in a police encounter knows that it is better to show
respect to a police officer than to question the officer's authority, even when
you believe that the officer has made a mistake. This is particularly true for
black men. When a black male challenges the authority of a cop, too often
the response is violent."' During police confrontations, black men get the
message that they are second class citizens.
Black men also get the message that their rights do not matter to those
who are in control. Many of the black males detained and searched after the
Stuart shooting knew that their skin color was the reason they were being
hassled. The police certainly had no individualized suspicion for the many
investigatory intrusions that occurred. Yet, city officials-including the
Mayor of Boston and high-ranking police officials-took no steps to curb
this offensive police conduct. Even after this police action was recognized as
blatantly violating constitutional norms, one police offical was quoted as saying that too much criticism had been focused on police tactics." 2
Although someone with a "very middle-class white view of life," might
see the issue differently," l3 sub-arrest or investigatory detentions undermine
the fourth amendment rights of disfavored citizens. Aggressive police tactics
only breed resentment among its victims." 4 On paper, the theory of subarrest seizures sounds quite reasonable. In practice, however, sub-arrest
110 Schwartz, supra note 66, at 452-53.
I" See, e.g., Jackson, Police Embody Racism To My People, N.Y. Times, Jan. 23,
1989, at A25, col. 1 (relating a history of police power as an enforcement mechanism for
societal racism).
112 Thomas, supra note 93, at 12, col. 1 (Deputy Police Superintendent William
Celester was quoted as saying that there had been too much debate over police search
tactics: "It has done us no good to point the finger ....The time for criticism is over.").
113 Amsterdam, supra note 16, at 405.
114 Walker, supra note 103, at 47, col. 2 (" 'People feel victimized not only by the
gangs but by the police. It leads to schizophrenic behavior. It makes people more
reluctant to give information to the police when they think police are also violating their
rights.' ") (quoting Louis Elisa, president of the Boston branch of the NAACP); Id. at
col. 3 (" 'The policy [of randomly stopping and frisking gang members] doesn't do what
it's supposed to do and it's destructive. It's ineffective as a crime-fighting device. It
creates a credibility gap, especially among the young adults they need to be able to work
with.' ") (quoting a lawyer who works with indigents in the Roxbury area of Boston).
Advocates of indiscriminate investigatory seizures often contend that such procedures
will prevent violent crimes or deter drug use. See, e.g., Lupo, supra note 94, at 14, col. 3.
These claims have not been proven. These proponents of unlimited police discretion are
asking society to believe that giving the police unfettered discretion to stop and search
anyone they wished will eliminate violent crime and drug use. There is certainly no
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detentions remind certain elements of society that the fourth amendment is
inapplicable in their neighborhoods, and that the police consider them to be
"sub-citizens."
C. Protectingthe Home, Police Perjury, and the Police Feeling Betrayed
In a chapter entitled, "Truth And The Temptations To Perjury," Professor Uviller opines that "the major temptation to [police] perjury ...

is the

desire to evade the effects of constitutional rulings that seem to nullify good,
honest police work" (p. 113). To illustrate the point he describes an incident
involving the arrest of a suspect in the suspect's mother's apartment. The
cops got a tip that a suspect they had been looking for was seen going into
his mother's home in the Bronx. The police left for the Bronx, but on the
way realized that a warrant would be necessary to enter the apartment to
make the arrest. This realization, however, was not enough to deter the cops
from getting their man. Instead of getting a warrant, the cops, according to
Sergeant Marty Browne's account to Professor Uviller, did the following:
"These are Spanish people," he explained to me. "Good people.
Mother works, father works. They know we're looking for their boy.
And they know why. So I decide, we're just not saying anything. We'll
just stand there and see what happens." Marty chuckled at the
recollection.
"So that's what we did. We rang the bell, and then we just stood
there. The mother took one look at us. She knew who we were and she
knew what we wanted. We didn't have to say a word. She went back
into the apartment, and pretty soon who comes out of the bedroom but
our man. He just says, 'Aw, shit' and starts to get dressed. He packs
his little bag for Rikers Island [the local jail], he knows where he's
empirical evidence to support their position. Indeed, a "special committee" of the
American Bar Association recently reported that:
police are not necessarily deterred by the Fourth Amendment when they are
searching for drugs or guns. This is evidence that certain disregard for the Fourth
Amendment, specifically in drug cases, may be an unavoidable by-product of a drug
problem so pervasive that the police feel they sometimes must violate constitutional
restraints in order to regain control of the streets. It is equally important to realize
that the problem is drug use and not the constitutional restrictions on the police. The
legal and illegal searches and arrests for drugs have generally proven ineffective in
controlling or reducing the drug problem.

A.B.A. CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CRISIS 46 (1988) (prepared
by the Special Committee on Criminal Justice in a Free Society).
More plausible is the view that police response to high-profile crimes is a manifestation
of frustration and political pressure. Reasonable persons can appreciate the frustration of
the police, and everyone sympathizes with the victims of violent crime. But, society
should not throw away a cherished liberty-the right to walk the streets without government intrusion-because we are angry and frustrated. More importantly, society should
not give up constitutional freedoms for short-sighted and probably ineffective solutions
that will not solve our problems.
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headed. We're still just standing there talking to each other about nothing. He kisses his momma goodbye, he kisses his grandmomma goodbye, he tells his little sister to be good, he comes out in the hall and tells
us he's ready, and that's it. No one said, 'What right do you have?' or
'Lemme see your warrant.' I think those people were just as glad to see
him go. They know he's bad news." (p. 115).
Professor Uviller comments that Sergeant Browne's "educated common
sense" got the police out of a constitutional dilemma, and provided a solution for a situation where other cops "might have been caught between the
conflicting demands of action and restraint" (p. 115). According to Professor Uviller this incident illustrates the nature of most police perjury: the
"instrumental adjustment. A slight alteration in the facts to accommodate
an unwieldy constitutional constraint and obtain a just result." (pp. 115116).
Professor Uviller believes that "most police officers regard such alterations
of events as the natural and inevitable outgrowth of artificial and unrealistic
post facto judgments that release criminals" (p. 116). He recognizes, however, that "there is no justification for perjury, whatever the 'ultimate truth'
that may be advanced by the instrumental lie. And when the lying witness is
a police officer, the social gravity of the offense increases." (p. 116). Nonetheless, Professor Uviller "cannot confidently contradict the idea that some
varieties of perjury, if not exactly virtuous, are less treacherous than others"
(p. 117). But where is the distinction? Professor Uviller explains that:
[p]erjury that creates artificial evidence distorts the data being considered by the jury and perverts the basic premise that twelve citizens, not
the police, should make the determination of whether the person on
trial is the culprit. But lies that result in a more complete picture of the
events on trial contribute to the accuracy of the verdict. (p. 117).

Professor Uviller recognizes that instrumentaladjustments are unacceptable
in our legal system (p. 116). Yet, he notes that the police do not find this
choice "entirely convincing" (p. 118). It seems that Professor Uviller wants
the reader to sympathize with police officers. The cops who want to do what
is right "are alarmed to discover that what appears to them as clearly right is
illegal" (p. 118). When the cops believe unrealistic or irrational rules are
imposed by the judiciary, "the temptations to evasion are almost irresistible"
(p. 118).
What should we make of all of this? Professor Uviller paints a picture in
which the cops feel they are in a no-win contest. They are asked to perform
difficult jobs handcuffed by unwieldy constitutional rules that get in the way
of justice. And when they lie in order to convict a guilty thug, they risk
being charged with perjury. Ultimately, the cops feel "'betrayed" because
"their own ideas of fair play" are subordinated to constitutional rulings fashioned by a Court that is more interested in protecting the rights of the bad
guys (p. 118).
Before we offer sympathy for "instrumental adjustments" by the police,
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let's consider another side. Why are we asked to sympathize with Sergeant
Browne and his officers? It is certainly not unreasonable to require compliance with the fourth amendment and thus require a warrant before aresting
someone in a private home. If the fourth amendment means anything, it
requires the police to obtain the approval of a judge before15they are permitted to invade the privacy of an otherwise peaceful home.
Noncompliance with the fourth amendment seems especially egregious in
Sergeant Browne's example. First, the Sergeant had time to obtain a warrant." 6 There is no suggestion of exigency which required the police to act
immediately. Second, the police presence ,certainly infringed the fourth
amendment interests of the arrestee and his family. Did the Sergeant really
believe that the family would simply ignore the several officers standing
outside their doorway? Of course not. Imagine several armed officers standing at your front door-simply waiting to "see what happens" (p. 117).
How would you feel? What would you do? It is not surprising that the
mother did not ask to see Sergeant Browne's warrant. In the real world,
people are afraid of the power of the, police and want to minimize the
chances of that power being asserted over them. People do not assert their
rights because they know the police are not always respectful of those rights.
It is my guess that the average family would not only feel confusion and fear,
but would feel very intimidated by the police presence and thus likely to
comply with the demands of the police. Officers do not have to march into
one's living room to threaten the sanctity of a home. A coercive police presence on the front doorstep can be just as intrusive on fourth amendment
values (and just as effective for the police) as a physical invasion." 7
Moreover, the fact that the family was a "good" Spanish family is no
"1 "In terms that apply equally to seizures of property and to seizures of persons, the
Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house. Absent exigent
circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant." Payton
v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980).
116 Of course, police officers sometimes confront bureaucratic obstacles to obtaining a
warrant. See H.R. UVILLER, supra note 6, at 127-30 (describing the reluctance of the
Manhattan District Attorney Office's to institute a routine procedure for police officers to
obtain telephone search warrant); infra note 118.
"17 See, e.g., United States v. Morgan, 743 F.2d 11'58, 1166 (6th Cir. 1984) (defendant
"appeared at the door only because of the coercive police behavior taking place outside of
the house .... Although there was no direct police entry into [the home] prior to the
[defendant's] arrest, the constructive entry accomplished' the same thing, namely, the
arrest of [the defendant]"), cert denied, 471 U.S. 1061 (1984).
It has been argued that there is no fourth amendment violation if the police-intending
to make an arrest-knock on the door and the arrestee appears at the door, or is
summoned to the door by another occupant of the home. See generally 2 W. LAFAVE,
supra note 23, § 6.1(e), at 587-95. Professor LaFave argues that an arrest in these
circumstances is permissible because, inter alia, there is nothing in the Court's precedents
which prohibit a person from surrendering at his doorway, and the warrant requirement
for arresting a person inside a home "makes sense only in terms of the entry, rather than
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excuse for acting without a warrant. Does this mean that the police have
less respect for the constitutional rights of working-class ethnic individuals?
If the family was black and lived in Harlem, would the police have simply
waited for their man to "voluntarily" come outside? If the family was a
white, Anglo-American protestant family living in a posh Fifth Avenue
condo would the police have gone to the apartment without a warrant? And
what if the police had come upon a "not-so-good" family that demanded
that the police comply with the fourth amendment before invading their
home, should the cops (or society) think any less of such a family? If such a
family had slammed the door in the face of the cops, it is hard to believe that
Sergeant Browne and his officers would have left the scene without their
118

suspect.

the arrest; the arrest itself is no 'more threatening or humiliating than a street arrest.'"
Id. at 590 (quoting MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE 307 (1975)).
With all due respect to Professor LaFave, I disagree. First, although Payton and its
progeny certainly contain no prohibition against a person surrendering at the door, this
assertion begs the question. The essential inquiry in circumstances where the police
appear at the door are the reasons for the so-called "surrender." I contend that average
citizens confronted with police officers standing at their doorway feel little choice but to
submit to the authority of the police. Professor LaFave notes that if the intended arrestee
withdraws or retreats into the premises to thwart the arrest, "then it is hardly unfair that
the police should be required to withdraw and return another time with a warrant." W.
LAFAVE, supra note 23, at 591 (footnote omitted). While I agree, it cannot be fair to
expect the typical arrestee to know of his right (which the Supreme Court has yet to
announce, and is not likely to announce anytime soon) to thwart the arrest. It may be
that "every schoolboy" is familiar with the Miranda warnings, see Michigan v. Tucker,
417 U.S. 433, 439 (1974), but I doubt the typical arrestee is as well-versed in the nuances
of the fourth amendment.
Second, Professor LaFave also argues that the warrant requirement is meaningful only
in the context of an entry into the home. Accordingly, he believes that if "the arrest can
be accomplished without entry, it should be deemed lawful notwithstanding the absence
of a warrant, even ifthe arrestee was just inside rather than on the threshold at the time."
W. LAFAVE, supra note 23, at 590. Professor LaFave contends that this view is
supported by Payton, which emphasizes-according to LaFave-actual entry into a
home. Id.
But as Professor LaFave later notes, the principle at stake in Payton has not been given
a crabbed reading by all courts; fourth amendment protection of the home has not been
confined to physical or actual entries into a home by government agents. Id. at 589 (and
cases cited). In fact, Payton did not address the question of forced removal from a home
without entry. Coercive police behavior outside a home which results in the removal or
arrest of a legitimate occupant violates the fourth amendment just as actual entry to
accomplish the same result does. And, when police announce their presence outside a
home, they infringe the solitude of those inside. Officers do not have to brandish their
guns or use loudspeakers to subvert the principle embodied in the fourth amendment.
Subtler methods may be just as threatening.
118 As he related to Professor Uviller, Sergeant Browne was not going to let something
as trivial as the fourth amendment's warrant requirement stand in the way of nabbing his
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Although Professor Uviller believes that Sergeant Browne's "common
sense" worked to resolve a legal dilemma, it would have been preferrable
that Sergeant Browne follow the "common sense" provided by established
fourth amendment jurisprudence: prior judicial authorization is required
before invading the privacy and solitude of a home." 9 There is nothing
"unwieldy" or "unrealistic" about this requirement. It is a rule that is not
only consistent with our constitutional heritage, 120 but is also preferred
suspect: "Hell, by the time we got a warrant-even if we could find a D.A. who would
okay a warrant, which I doubt-our man would be in the wind. I'll tell you one thing: I
don't know how, but I [was] not going back empty-handed." H.R. UVILLER, supra note
6, at 114.
In defense of Sergeant Browne, Professor Uviller notes that the police "would be right
to think that they would probably not be able to get an arrest warrant." Id. Under New
York law, courts are authorized to issue arrest warrants only after the filing of a formal
accusatory instrument. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW 120.20(1) (McKinney 1981).
Professor Uviller also notes that prosecutors are reluctant to file such an instrument
before arrest because the formal accusation "deprives the police of an opportunity to
converse with the mirandized suspect in the absence of an attorney." H.R. UVILLER,
supra note 6, at 115.
None of this, in my view, excuses Sergeant Browne's violation of the fourth
amendment. First, even if Sergeant Browne's suspect had not been indicted, section
120.20(1) permits the issuance of an arrest warrant on the basis of a proper felony
complaint. See People v. Dixon, 147 A.D.2d 769, 772, 537 N.Y.S.2d 991, 993 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1989). If a felony complaint or some other formal accusation has not been
filed against a person, certainly the police should not be free to arrest someone in a
private home based on their own determination that probable cause exists.
The right of officers to thrust themselves into a home is also of grave concern, not
only to the individual but to a society which chooses to dwell in reasonable security
and freedom from surveillance. When the right of privacy must reasonably yield to
the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman
or government enforcement agent.
See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
Second, there is no justification for sacrificing fourth amendment values because police
officers did not wish to lose the opportunity to "converse" with a suspect who is entitled
to a lawyer's advice. In effect, the police want to trash fourth amendment principles so
that they can avoid the strictures of the fifth and sixth amendments.
...See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981) (absent exigent circumstances or
consent, the home of a third party may not be searched without a search warrant where
the police are seeking a fugitive from justice for whom they have an arrest warrant);
Payton v. New York 445 U.S. 573 (1980) (police are forbidden to conduct warrantless
and non-consensual entry into a suspect's home in order to make a routine felony arrest);
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978) (warrantless search of an apartment is not
constitutionally permissible simply because a homicide had occurred there); United
States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972) (the President may not
authorize the Attorney General to conduct electronic surveillance of suspects' telephones
in internal security matters without prior judicial approval).
120 See, e.g., N. LASSON, supra note 41, at 59-60 (describing James Otis's argument
against general warrants: "That a man's house was his castle was one of the most
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because of its clarity and predictability-'
Had the cops followed the law,
there would have been no temptations to manufacture an "instrumental
adjustment" of the facts and no worry about being charged with perjury.
The arrest effectuated by Sergeant Browne is an "easy" case; the Constitution should have been followed. But even in the difficult cases, I am quite
comfortable contesting the claim that some "varieties of perjury, if not
exactly virtuous, are less treacherous than others" (pp. 116-17). And I certainly do not accept the notion that the police are justified in feeling
"betrayed" because the Court has imposed constitutional rules that do not
comport with the cops' "own ideas of fair play" (p. .118).
Where does this all lead? First, while police perjury may contribute to the
accuracy of some criminal verdicts, this assertion does not prove that some
police lies are less treacherous than others. It reflects, Professor Uviller's
belief that accurate jury verdicts are extremely important. The Court, however, has a responsibility to consider other values when deciding constitutional cases. When the police obtain a reliable confession from a criminal
suspect in violation of his privilege against self-incrimination, this evidence is
excluded from the trial even though its admission is highly probative of the
defendant's guilt or innocence. Similarly, when police trangress fourth
amendment principles, reliable evidence is often excluded from a criminal
trial. Indeed, "there is nothing new in the realization that the Constitution
sometimes insulates the criminality of a few in order to protect the privacy of
us all."' 2 Professor Uviller's distinction between different forms of police
perjury, in the end, does not prove his point that some police perjury isconstitutionally speaking-less troublesome than others. I share his view
that accurate jury verdicts are very important; I disagree, however, with his
suggestion that their importance provides a pretext for police lies regarding
how otherwise relevant and reliable evidence was secured.
Second, if we wink at police, perjury in a murder case, how do we react to
police perjury in a drug case? In each case, it can be argued that the police
are simply providing "a more complete picture" to help advance the accuracy of the verdict. I would rather have the cops tell the truth on the witness
stand, even if it means having vital evidence suppressed, than send a message
that it is okay to lie in a courtroom so long as the guilty are the only ones

essential branches of English liberty, a privilege totally annihilated by [the] general
warrant. Customhouse officers were given permission to enter houses when they
pleased.").
121 Professor Uviller recognizes this point as well.
"The virtue of [the warrant
preferepqe rule], of course, is predictability. And the principal virtue of predictability in
this area, it seems to me, is clarity of instruction to the police in the field concerning the
constitutional limits on their investigative authority." H.R. UVILLER, supra note 6, at
122.
122 Arizona v. Hicks, 107 S. Ct. 1149, 1155 (1987).
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affected. In the end, of course, all of society is tainted-including the judiciary-when illegally obtained evidence is used at trial.12
In cases where cops knowingly violate the law, the choice, in my view, is
clear. Adherence to, and enforcement of, the Bill of Rights clearly takes
precedence over an officer's decision to lie about the facts of a case. A contrary position would mock the Constitution, and allow individual officers to
selectively enforce the Constitution. At times; our legal system may produce
results that seem absurd to a layperson. But this result was not foisted upon
us by the so-called "liberal" Warren Court; it is a choice adopted over century ago when Chief Justice Marshall. said in Marbury v. Madision that
"[the very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every
individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an
injury."'
In other words, the exclusion of evidence illegally obtained by
the police is the price we pay for living in a society governed by law, rather
than by individual officials.' 25
Thus, I remain unconvinced that feelings of betrayal are justified when the
judiciary imposes rules out of step with the cops' "own ideas of fair play." If
officers feel betrayed it may be because they have a flawed or incomplete
view of the "law" they are sworn to uphold or their role in the legal system.
In United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), Justice Brennan stated in dissent
that the fourth amendment
123

restrains the power of the government as a whole; it does not specify only a
particular agency and exempt all others. The judiciary is responsible; no less than
the executive, for ensuring that constitutional rights are respected.... Because...
evidence [seized by the police] generally has utility in our legal system only in the
context of a trial supervised by a judge, it is apparent that the admission of illegally
obtained evidence implicates the same constitutional concerns as the initial seizure of
that evidence. Indeed, by admitting unlawfully seized evidence, the judiciary
becomes a part of what is in fact a single governmental action prohibited by the
terms of the [Fourth] Amendment.
Id. at 932-33 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
124 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803). Chief Justice Marshall
went on to note that "where a specific duty is assigned by law, and individual rights
depend upon the performance of that duty, it seems equally clear that the individual who
considers himself injured, has a right to resort to the laws of his country for a remedy."

Id. at 166.
125 Justice Stewart summarized the matter very well when he stated:
The Bill of Rights is but one component of our legal system-the one that limits the
government's reach. The primary responsibility for enforcing the Constitution's
limits on government, at least since the time of Marbury v. Madison, has been vested
in the judicial branch. In general, when law enforcement officials violate a person's
fourth amendment rights, they do so in attempting to obtain evidence for use in
criminal proceedings. To give effect to the Constitution's prohibition against illegal
searches and seizures, it may be necessary for the judiciary to remove the incentive
for violating it. Thus, it may be argued that although the Constitution does not
explicitly provide for exclusion, the need to enforce the Constitution's limits on
government-to preserve the rule of law-requires an exclusionary rule.
Stewart, supra note 17, at 1384 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
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While our legal system has always made room for the "common sense ''l 6
and discretionary judgments 1" that officers exercise on a daily basis, it
includes many other participants and values that are beyond the control of
the police.128 In the end, this is the same legal system that the police
them29
selves turn to when their constitutional freedoms are in jeopardy.'

IV.

A SKEPTIC'S VIEW OF MIRANDA

30
Professor Uviller is not a fan of the ruling in Miranda v. Arizona.'
Miranda established that persons subjected to custodial interrogation first,
must be informed of their legal right to remain silent and their right to have

126 See H.R. UVILLER, supra note 6, at 158 ("I suspect that-at least among the better

cops-a strong countervailing force keeps the discretionary balance tipped toward
initiative and the dictates of common sense. Like most people, cops were raised with a
strong sense of justice, and they naturally apply it when the occasion arises.").
127 Id. at 160 ("Acknowledged or not, discretion and judgment are part of the Job.
The issue, then, is not whether cops should make arrest decisions but whether credibility
factors should influence them.").
128 I do not want to suggest that the police are always disrespectful of constitutional

liberties. In one instance the police seemed more respectful toward fourth amendment
rights than Professor Uviller. During this incident, the cops pulled over a vehicle, briefly
spoke with the driver and checked his documents. Afterwards, the motorist was allowed
to leave and the officers returned to their car. The following exchange occurred between
the cops and Professor Uviller:
"What was that all about?" I asked. "No problem. Papers in order. No weapons."
But why had they stopped [the motorist] in the first place, I wanted to know. Had I
noticed, they asked, that the trunk lock had a reinforcing metal plate around it? No,
I hadn't, but what if it did? Well, they told me, people down here don't usually put
those on their cars, especially old heaps like that one. This is about the hour for
drug deliveries; thought we'd check it out. Then why hadn't they looked in the
trunk, I persisted. "Don't you think, Professor, that might have violated their
constitutional rights?" was the answer I got. Scholars might debate the point; the
important thing to me was that the cops thought of it at all.
Id. at 100 (emphasis added).
In my view, the cops were right, and Professor Uviller was wrong. It is hard to find
probable cause to search a trunk merely because it has a reinforcing lock on it. Come to
think of it, if the cops were right that probable cause did not exist to search the trunk,
what justified the stop in the first place?
129 See, e.g., National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384, 1396
(1989) (upholding a suspicionless drug testing program for employees of the Customs
Service who apply for promotion to positions involving the interdiction of illegal
narcotics, or apply for positions that require the employee to carry a weapon).
130 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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counsel present. 13' From the time that it was decided, Miranda has been
hotly debated. The debate continues today.3 2
Professor Uviller takes several shots at Miranda. Although I find some of
his comments-such as his criticism that the Court paid too much attention
to police training manuals-unpersuasive,13 s he makes three forceful points
which merit response.
'3'
The warnings are designed to inform the suspect of the following: that he has a
right to remain silent; anything that he says can be used against him at trial; he has the
right to have counsel present during interrogation by the police; and that if he cannot
afford his own counsel, the state will provide access to free counsel for him. Id. at 436.

132 See,

e.g.,

PROCEDURE
133

Y. KAMISAR,

W.

LAFAVE

&

J.

ISRAEL,

MODERN

CRIMINAL

543-59 (7th ed. 1990) (sampling the current debate among legal scholars).

Professor Uviller complains that the Miranda Court had no empirical basis for

believing that the police manuals it referred to, see Miranda, 384 U.S. at 449-54, were
actually used by police interrogators. H.R. UVILLER, supra note 6, at 192. He also
contends that
the Court's "psychological assumption concerning the motivation to confess and the
will to resist [was] vulnerable. Even accepting the Court's finding that the
'atmosphere' of custodial interrogation is inherently coercive, it is difficult to believe
that every suspect,, even the. street-wise and prison-hardened felon, suffers an
appreciable loss of will the instant he finds himself in a police station.
Id. (emphasis added)..
Professor Uviller's first criticism has already been answered. Two weeks after Miranda
was decided, the Attorney General of California reported "'wide use' in his state of the
police interrogation manuals criticized by the Court." Kamisar, A Dissent From The
Miranda Dissents: Some Comments On The "New" Fifth Amendment And The Old "Voluntariness" Test, 65 MICH. L. REV. 59, 86 n.109 (1966). Moreover, the Court cannot be
blamed for the lack of "hard" empirical data regarding what police techniques were used
behind the doors of police interrogation rooms. Whose fault is it that police interrogations occur in secret? The Court? The suspect?
Finally, although Professor Uviller criticizes the Court for relying on the training
manuals, he does not tell us what the Court should have used to provide an alternative
view of what occurred during police interrogations. The works of Professors Inbau and
Reid, the authors of the training manuals, were used by several law enforcement agencies
to train police officials. Their work reflected what was lawful and proper in the eyes of
those responsible for training police recruits. They were willing to put into writing and
thus endorse certain interrogation methods. It seems reasonable for the Court to believe
(in the absence of contrary objective evidence) that the police were employing-at the
very least-these methods, not to mention methods which nobody was willing to put in
writing but surfaced from time to time.
Therefore, even though the Court could not know for certain whether the recommended interrogation techniques were actually used by individual officers, the Court was
on solid ground in believing that incommunicado police interrogation implicates a suspect's privilege against self-incrimination. See Y. KAMISAR, Equal Justice in the
Gatehouses and Mansions of American CriminalProcedure, in POLICE INTERROGATION
AND CONFESSIONS: ESSAYS IN LAW AND POLICY

28 (1980) ("[I]n the absence of judge

and jury, law enforcement officers can-and without hesitation do-resort to methods
they would never consider utilizing at the trial; the case for the prosecution is stronger-
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First, Professor Uviller argues that the Miranda holding requires that we
accept illusion over reality. Under Miranda's analysis,
[p]olice, the felon's natural adversary, are converted by the Constitution
into disinterested advisors-even counselors-suggesting that [the suspect] refuse their demand for cooperation. All players must solemnly
pretend to a meaningful exchange of words, though the ritual has likely
lost all real meaning to both parties. From the mere recital of [the
Miranda warnings], appellate courts are comforted to believe that
uncoerced choice is suddenly possible in the previously oppressive interaction between police and suspect, that isolation and police domination
have miraculously lost their coercive influence, and that in this newly
purged atmosphere the cornered felon may freely forego his right to
silence and make a voluntary confession. (p. 196).
Professor Uviller continues, stating that "acceptance of this myth is an act of
faith beyond the bounds of reason" (p. 196).'Second, Professor Uviller
asserts that Miranda contains an inherent flaw: "If a confession given in
police custody is necessarily coerced, so is a waiver." (p. 196). He opines
that if the Court was correct in 1966 when it explained that "compulsion
[was] inherent" during custodial interrogation by the police," 5 then the
Miranda warning does not really protect a suspect's rights. Rather, he
argues that "[t]hose suspects actually intimidated by the circumstances of
custody are hardly reassured by hearing the ritual incantation from their
inquisitors" (p. 196). Finally Professor Uviller argues that only a "truly
noncoercive situation" will guarantee that a suspect has freely chosen to
speak with the police. Thus, "for doctrinal as well as practical reasons, we
probably would have done better to confine the operation of the Fifth
Amendment privilege to those situations in which true coercion of the preMiranda variety could be discerned and leave ritual purges of chimerical
demons to the witch doctors" (p. 197).
Professor Uviller's first two criticisms-that Miranda substitutes form
much stronger-if what was done to the defendant was done away from the restraining
influence of a public trial in an open courtroom") (reprinted from CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN
OUR TIME 11 (A. Howard, ed. 1965)).
Professor Uviller's second point-that the "street-wise and prison-hardened suspect"
may not be affected by the pressure of incommunicado interrogation-misses another
important point of Miranda. One may assume that the "professional" felon will not
always be overpowered by custodial interrogation. This stipulation, however, does not
negate the need for Miranda'sholding. The information provided by the Miranda warnings are for the benefit of the ignorant, the nervous, and the poor. See infra notes 147-51

and accompanying text.
134 In another context, Professor Uviller has called the result obtained in Miranda a
"naive solution." Uviller, supra note 14, at 1168.
135 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 458 (stating that "[u]nless adequate protective devices are
employed to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings, no statement
obtained trom the defendant can truly be the product of his free choice").
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over reality and "adds little to the suspect's protection' (p: 196)-while persuasive on their face, do not justify overruling Miranda. Indeed, his observations make a convincing case for strengthening the rights of persons
subjected to custodial interrogation.1' He argues that "if a confession given
in police custody is necessarily coerced, so is a waiver."' 3 7 I agree, but I am
sure Professor Uviller -would not approve of one obvious solution to this
problem: giving suspects the non-waivable right to talk to a lawyer before
undergoing custodial interrogation by the police. l" Moreover, if Professor
Uviller is correct that the Miranda ritual "has likely lost all real meaning"
(p. 196) to both the suspect and police, then the Court would do better to
resuscitate the protections that Miranda
sought to provide, rather than wink
39
at blatant derelictions by the police.'
From a broader perspective, Professor Uviller's critique might suggest to
131 See Ogletree, Are Confessions Really Good for the Soul?: A Proposal to Mirandize

Miranda, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1826, 1842 (1987) (arguing that Miranda should be
modified so that "[a]ll suspects in custody.., have a nonwaiverable right to consult with
a lawyer before being interrogated by the police").
'-7 Other scholars have agreed with Professor Uviller on this point, see, e.g.,
Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 435, 454 (1987) (arguing that
"[t]he notion that police-initiated warnings can 'dispel' the compulsion [of custodial
interrogation] seems dubious at best").
Professor Uviller's criticism also points out, albeit indirectly, the deficiency in the
Court's recent decisions regarding whether -suspects have made valid and knowing
waivers of their rights under Miranda. If Professor Uviller is right to question the
circumstances under which a waiver is obtained, then one would expect the Court to be
careful in finding that a suspect had knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to silence
and right to have counsel present during interrogation. The Court's recent track-record
in this area, however, is suspect. See Duckworth v. Eagan 109 S. Ct. 2875, 2876 (1989)
(upholding warnings that informed an indigent suspect that a lawyer would be appointed
for him "if and when you go to court"); Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 529 (1987)
(finding a knowing waiver where suspect refused to give written statement in the absence
of counsel, but indicated a willingness to talk about incident); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S.
412, 420 (1986) (finding a valid waiver even though police failed to inform suspect that
his attorney was trying to reach him, and police lied to the attorney in telling her that
there would be no questioning of the suspect). See also Ogletree, supra note 136, at 1843
(arguing that the Court's approach to confessions since Miranda "reflects an
unwillingness to examine a suspect's true understandingof the rights to remain silent and
to have counsel present during police questioning").
138 See, e.g., Ogletree, supra note 136, at 1842 (contending that criminal suspects in
custody should have nonwaiverable right to consult with an attorney before undergoing
police interrogation); Kamisar, The Miranda Case, 20 Years Later, N.Y. Times, Jane 11,
1986, at A35, col. 3 .(arguing that "[t]he principle weakness of Miranda (or its saving
grace, depending on one's viewpoint) is that it does allow someone subjected to the
pressures of arrest and detention to waive his rights without actually obtaining a lawyer's
advice").
139 A recent seventh circuit decision that was overturned by the Supreme Court is
illustrative. At issue was a version of the Miranda warnings used by the Hammond,
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the layperson that the Miranda warnings not only do a bad job of protecting
the rights of a suspect, they also "handcuff" the police. But as Professor
Schulhofer has already described, this is not the case: "[t]he warnings work
to liberate the police" because they allow the continued questioning of an
isolated suspect, a circumstance which Miranda found to be constitutionally
unsound. 40 Thus, it seems unfair to attack the warnings constructed in
Miranda. The warnings were a product of a "compromise" decision. To
truly protect the rights of criminal suspects, the Court could have held that
the police were required to provide a "station house lawyer" for all suspects. 4' Alternatively, the Court could have declared the then current status of interrogation unconstitutional, and left the police to fend for
themselves in deciding what was permissible.
Instead, the Court reached
Indiana police officers that included the following passage designed to inform a suspect of
his right to have free legal counsel present prior to any interrogation by the police:
"Before we ask you any questions, you must understand your rights. You have the
right to remain silent. Anything you say can be used against you in court. You have
a right to talk to a lawyerfor advice before we ask you any questions, and to have him
with you during questioning. You have this right to the, advice and presence of a
lawyer even if you cannot afford to hire one. We have no way of giving you a lawyer,

but one will be appointedfor you, if you wish, if and when you go to court. If you wish
to answer questions now without a lawyer present, you have the right to stop
answering questions at any time. You also have the right to stop answering at any
time until you've talked to a lawyer."
Eagan v. Duckworth, 843 F.2d 1554, 1555-56 (7th Cir. 1988), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 2875
(1989).
Chief Justice Rehnquist found no constitutional error with the italicized language
quoted above. The warnings given to Eagan, according to the Chief Justice, "touched all
of the bases required by Miranda." Duckworth v. Eagan, 109 S. Ct. 2875, 2880. I disagree. The phrase "if and when you go to court" of the Hammond warning is patent
violation of Miranda's requirement to inform indigent suspects by "effective and express
explanation," Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473, of their rights during custodial interrogation.
Miranda made absolutely clear that. "if police propose to interrogate a person they must
make known to him that he is entitled to a lawyer and that if he cannot afford one, a
lawyer will be provided for him prior to any interrogation." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474
(emphasis added).
At best, the warnings in Eagan are hopelessly misleading to an indigent unaware of his
rights, and at worst, are purposefully designed to deter indigent suspects from invoking
their right to have legal counsel present during any police interrogation. See Kamisar,
Duckworth v. Eagan: A Little-Noticed Miranda Case That May Cause Much Mischief, 25
CRIM. L. BULL. 550, 560 (1989) (stating that "[t]he best explanation for the failure of the
Hammond police to abandon their version of the warnings in favor of the more common
variety is the belief, and a well-founded one, that their formulation tends to confuse unsophisticated indigent suspects and tends to induce them to forgo the right to counsel at the
critical moment").
140 Schulhofer, supra note 137, at 454.
14' Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474.
142 Schulhofer, supra note 137, at 454. (stating that "the Court would have incurred
far more police criticism if it had remained within a narrow conception of the judicial
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for a middle ground that was designed to address a process that threatened
43

fundamental values of our accusatorial system of criminal justice.
Professor Uviller contends that it would be better to return to preMiranda days where fifth amendment violations were measured by whether
there was "true coercion" during police interrogation. This position can be
interpreted in several ways. If Professor Uviller is suggesting that the fifth
amendment only prohibits "compelled"' 14 self incrimination, he is right; but
he is also begging the question when he suggests that returning to preMiranda days will solve our constitutional problems with confessions.
One of the purposes of the Miranda ruling was to provide a uniform solution to the difficulty in determining when a confession had in fact been
obtained under coercive circumstances. 145 Miranda also sought to clarify
that the fifth amendment governed confessions obtained by the police
outside of the judicial process.'" Before Miranda, some contested whether
the privilege against self-incrimination applied to "extra-judicial" confessions, and the Court had utilized a case-by-case approach in evaluating the
claims that came before it. This ad hoc method of adjudicating claims 1of
47
involuntary confessions was not only impractical, it was also unworkable.
role, pronounced interrogation 'inherently compelling,' and then left law enforcement
officials to guess about what countermeasures would keep police on the safe side of the
constitutional line").
143 See Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 54 (1949) (describing "the protection of the
accused from confessions extorted through whatever form of police pressures" as a
characteristic of our accusatorial system).
144 The fifth amendment's privilege against self incrimination states: "No person...
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself ... " U.S. CONST.
amend. V.
141 Despite the claims of some critics, Miranda did not rule out effective alternatives
designed to inform a suspect of his constitutional rights. On the contrary, the Court
required its version of the warnings as a "prerequisite to the admissibility of any
statement made by a defendant" only "in the absence of a fully effective equivalent."
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476. The Court stated further that
the Constitution itself does not require any specific code of procedures for protecting
the privilege against self-incrimination during custodial interrogation. Congress and
the States are free to develop their own safeguards for the privilege, so long as they
are fully as effective as those described above in informing accused persons of their
right of silence and in affording continuous opportunity to exercise it.
Id. at 490.
146 Although there was considerable debate on whether the right against selfincrmination applies to the police station, there is not doubt that the right
grew out of a protest against incriminating interrogation prior to formal accusation.
That is, the maxim nemo teneture seipsum prodere (no one is bound to accuse
himself) originally meant that no one was obligated to supply the evidence that
could be used to indict him. Thus, from the very inception of the right, a suspect
could invoke it at the earliest stages of his interrogation.
L. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FWrH AMENDMENT xii (1986).
147 See, e.g., Schulhofer, Confessions and The Court (Book Review), 79 MICH. L. REV.
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And few persons, not even those out to "kill" Miranda, can convincingly
argue today that the fifth amendment should not apply to police interrogation tactics. 148
Even if Miranda did not go far enough in protecting the rights of criminal
suspects, a more fundamental objection remains to Professor Uviller's desire
to return to the pre-Mirandaera. The Miranda decision, like many Warren
Court rulings in the criminal procedure area, was also about equality and
justice. To its critics, Miranda took on "symbolic status" of the Warren
Court's commitment to equality under the law.'4 9 To those with a more
progressive view, Miranda was an attempt to fulfill our nation's commitment
to the ideal that the poor and minorities should receive15 treatment similiar to
that accorded the rich and white in our legal system. 0
Some feel that the Court-at least in the context of custodial interrogations-has no license to ensure that the poor enjoy the same rights accorded
the privileged. They argue that "guilt is personal."'' It might also be
argued that Miranda has not helped much because suspects continue to confess despite being told their rights. These claims miss the point of Miranda.
Guilt may be personal, but even persons suspected of criminal behavior are
entitled to know their rights. "It is the indigent and the ignorant who need
the Miranda warning."' 5 The Miranda warnings not only inform a suspect
865, 869-878

(1981)

(reviewing Y.

KAMISAR,

CONFESSIONS: ESSAYS IN LAW AND POLICY

POLICE

INTERROGATION

AND

(1980)); Kamisar, supra note 133, at 94-104.

148 But cf Grano, Rhode Island v. Innis: A Need To Reconsider The Constitutional
Premises Underlying The Law Of Confessions, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 26 (1979)

("[FIrom an historical perspective, application of... the fifth amendment protection
against compulsory self-incrimination beyond the judicial context-and especially to
police interrogation-is dubious.") (footnote omitted).
149 In a 1986 report to the United States Attorney General, the Justice Department's
Office of Legal Policy argued that
an abrogation of Miranda would be of broader import because of its symbolic status
as the epitome of Warren Court activism in the criminal law area. We accordingly
regard a challenge to Miranda as essential, not only in overcoming the detrimental
impact caused directly by this decision, but also as a critical step in moving to
repudiate a discredited criminal jurisprudence.
OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: ON THE LAW OF PRE-TRIAL INTERROGATION 119 (1986).
1' See, e.g., Frankel, From Private Fights to Public Justice, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 516,
527 (1976) (stating that "the Mirandadecision was ... strongly undergirded by the desire
to achieve equal treatment for the poor and the rich, the ignorant and the sophisticated")
(footnote omitted); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 472 (recognizing that "[t]he need for counsel in
order to protect the privilege exists for the indigent as well as the affluent").
151 Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1417, 1457 (1985) (footnote
omitted).
152 Krauthammer, The Miranda Scandal, The- Wash. Post Nat'l Weekly Ed.,
February, 16, 1987, at 29,,col. 1. See Schulhofer, supra note 137, at 454 (noting that "[a]t
the heart of the [Mirandacontroversy] is the suspect who does not know his rights, who
believes that the police are entitled to make him talk").

1990]

CONSTITUTION

of her rights, they also tell the suspect that the government will respect her
choice if she decides not to talk with the police.' 53 If the privilege against
self-incrimination is to have any meaning, this information is essential.
Finally, when critics of Miranda harken back to the "good old days" of
judging the voluntariness of a confession based on the "totality of the circumstances," I am reminded of the "message" sent to the police by Justices
Clark and Harlan in their dissenting opinion in Davis v. North Carolina."54
In Davis, a poor, black man of below average intelligence was held incommunicado for sixteen days. The sole purpose of Davis's detention was to
obtain a confession. 58 Davis was not advised of his rights. He was fed two
sandwiches and other "stuff" twice a day. He was subjected to daily interrogation sessions, and at one point was aroused at 5 a.m. to take a 14 mile hike
along railroad tracks while handcuffed to an officer. Putting aside Davis's
own allegations of police brutality," 8 even the Police Chief conceded that:
" 'I don't know anybody who has stayed in the city jail as long as this
boy.' "157
Despite all of this, Justices Clark and Harlan were willing to find that
Davis's eventual confession was voluntary and that he had not been subjected to unduly coercive interrogation. Of course, Justices Clark and
Harlan, spoke in dissent. But Davis's case might never have reached the
Court but for the fact that he was facing a death sentence. 58 More importantly, if the old voluntariness standard was adequate, why did it take so
[T]he operative premise of this line of [Miranda's]thought is apparently that a
person will be less intimidated by potential interrogators if he knows that [the police]
may only question him with his permission. The assumption is presumably that,
other things being equal, psychological freedom will be augmented by awareness of
constitutional freedom.
Schrock, Welsh & Collins, InterrogationRights: Reflections On Miranda v. Arizona, 52
So. CAL. L. REV. 1, 43 (1978). See also Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468 ("[T]he warnings will
show the individual that his interrogators are prepared to recognize his privilege should
he choose to exercise it."); White, Defending Miranda: A Reply to Professor Caplan, 39
Vand. L. Rev. 1, 6 (1986) ("Even if [a person] is aware of his right to remain silent, he
does not necessarily know that the officer is prepared to honor that right. The warnings
may be necessary to give him that assurance.").
's Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737 (1966).
1 On Davis' arrest sheet, the following notation was typed: "DO NOT ALLOW
ANYONE TO SEE DAVIS. OR ALLOW HIM TO USE TELEPHONE." Id. at 744.
15 Davis claimed that he was "beaten, threatened, and cursed by police and that he
was told he would get a hot bath and something to eat as soon as he signed a statement."
Id. at 741. He also charged that "he had repeatedly asked for a lawyer and that police
refused to allow him to obtain one." Id. The police denied each of these claims. Id. The
state did, however, opine that " '[s]urely, Davis was not such a sensitive person, after all
his years in prison, that "cussing" and being called "Nigger" constituted any degree of
fear or coercion.'" Id. at 741 n.2.
157 Id. at 743.
158 Kamisar, supra note 133, at 100-02.
151
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long for the judiciary to invalidate Davis's coerced confession? 59 What is
embarrassing about Davis is that the case had to go all the way to the
Supreme Court before the confession was ruled invalid.
If there was a return to the old "voluntariness" test, as Professor Uviller
and others propose, what would prevent the police from reverting back to
pre-Miranda interrogation tactics? Can it be said with assurance that the
current Court could not muster five votes to find that Davis's confession was
"voluntary" under the old totality of the circumstances test? 160 Do we really
want to return to the days when a confession was deemed voluntary despite
police lies and trickery during a fifty-three minute interrogation that caused
a suspect to collapse into a catatonic state?' 6 ' In pre-Miranda days, the
police could employ a lot of dubious tactics before
the Court would find that
62
a confession was "coerced" or "involuntary.'
159

Professor Kamisar has stated that:

The readiness with which the state and lower federal courts passing on the
admissibility of Davis' confessions accepted dubious police claims, and the looseness
with which they stated (or, more accurately, failed to state) 'the facts,' is hardly
calculated to inspire confidence in the workability and effectiveness of the
[voluntariness] test-from the defendant's point of view, at any rate.
Id. at 101.
'1
Cf Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 408-10 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(arguing that a confession was voluntary even though the defendant was questioned over
a three-hour period after being "seriously wounded" and placed in a hospital intensive
care unit, and after repeatedly indicating his desire to speak with a lawyer).
161 See Miller v. Fenton, 796 F.2d 598 (3d Cir. 1986). The reasoning of Miller is
discussed in Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 132, at 560-70.
162 Professor Kamisar has explained the Court's lexicon in the pre-Miranda era as
follows:
When the Court thought the conduct of the police interrogators was "not so bad"
it called the resulting confession "voluntary"-even though it might have been the
product of five or six hours of sustained interrogation. When the Court thought the
police conduct was intolerable or offensive (e.g., the police had stripped the suspect's
clothes off him, or slapped him, or deprived him of food or sleep) they called the
resulting confession "coerced" or "involuntary."
Much greater pressures were necessary to render a confession "coerced" or
"involuntary" under the old test for admitting confessions than are needed to make a
confession "compelled" within the meaning of the privilege against selfincrimination. That was the trouble[] with old test. That was why[] it was
abandoned in favor of Miranda.
Kamisar, Comments On The Confessions Cases of the 1984-85 Term: Part II Prepared
Remarks of Yale Kamisar at the U.S. Law Week's ConstitutionalLaw Conference 13-14
(Sept. 13, 1985) (on file with the author). See also Schulhofer, supra note 146, at 871

("[T]he voluntariness test clearly did authorize considerable pressure. Indeed, the conception of voluntariness indirectly encouraged police to pressure suspects because it
viewed police efforts to persuade a reticent suspect to talk as legitimate and highly
desirable.").
Even Justice Harlan, one of the Miranda dissenters, conceded that pre-Miranda standards of "voluntariness" were mostly legal fiction. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 515
(Harlan, J.,dissenting). He stated that
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Rather than return to this earlier era, Miranda seeks to eliminate some of
the coercion and pressure that exist during custodial interrogation. To be
sure, the Miranda warnings are no panacea for third degree police tactics.
Its safeguards pose no obstacle for the cop "who is prepared to lie from the
start."' 6 But for the conscientious officer and ignorant or confused suspect,
the Miranda warnings serve as a reminder that the Constitution, and not
individual officers, ultimately determines whether one's rights will be
respected.
V.

CONCLUSION

Professor Uviller has written an important and provocative book about
life as a police officer in New York's 9th Precinct. Academia too often
ignores the perspective of the cops on the street. Professor Uviller's narrative raises several important constitutional questions about the activities of
the police and how those activities impact on the constitutional liberty of
citizens. Although I disagree with some of the legal positions he discusses, I
greatly benefitted from reading Professor Uviller's book. Indeed, anyonewhether legal scholar or layperson-who is interested in understanding the
perspective of the cop, must read Tempered Zeal.

I think it must be frankly recognized at the outset that police questioning allowable
under due process precedents may inherently entail some pressure on the suspect
and may seek advantage in his ignorance or weaknesses. The atmosphere and questioning techniques, proper and fair though they be, can in themselves exert a tug on
the suspect to confess, and in this light "[t]o speak of any confessions of crime made
after arrest as being 'voluntary' or 'uncoerced' is somewhat inaccurate, although
traditional.
Id. (quoting Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 161 (Jackson, J.,dissenting)).
163 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 516 (Harlan, J., dissenting).

